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I. INTRODUCTION
A NEW ERA of camaraderie has entered the bitter Arab-Israeli conflict
as a result of Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the Camp
David Summit. This change in Egyptian attitude" marks a hopeful start
in future negotiations between Israel and her neighboring countries. Israel
and Egypt have been able to come to terms on most issues concerning the
Sinai, but have not been able to reach any agreement concerning the city
of Jerusalem. 2 When the Peace Treaty was being signed in Washington,
D.C., both Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin made conflicting remarks
in their speeches regarding Jerusalem. Anwar Sadat called for the return
of East Jerusalem and Arab sovereignty while Menachem Begin spoke of
the reunification in 1967 of the Old City (East Jerusalem) with the New
City (West Jerusalem).3
Jerusalem, a small tract of land situated in the Judean Hills, thirty-
five miles from the Mediterranean Sea,4 is a city which. retains an ancient
heritage5 and which has affected the central thought processes of major
civilizations for centuries. Within the city, Kings David and Solomon
*J.D. Candidate American University, Washington College of Law, 1981.
** The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Susan Bierman and
Burton D. Wechsler in preparation of this article.
I At issue is whether Egyptian policy has changed or whether merely Sadat's policy has
changed. Israel is concerned that the unstable nature of Middle East politics could lead to a
radical Moslem Government replacing Sadat and repudiating the peace treaty. The Wash.
Post, Feb. 10, 1980, § A, at 18, col. 1.
2Anwar Sadat has taken it upon himself to discuss the future of Jerusalem and a Pal-
estinian state in the West Bank, even though the rest of the 'Aiab World condemns his
negotiations with Israel. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 2, 1979, at
11, col. 1.
Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty in Washington, D.C. with
President Carter as witness and co-signatory. The terms of the Peace Treaty can be found
in Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, reprinted in Dep't of State, Bureau of Pub-
lic Affairs, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (Dep't of State Pub. 8973, 1979).
4 Pfaff, Jerusalem: Keystone for an Arab-Israeli Settlement in, I ARAn-IsRAELI CON-
FLICT 1010, 1012 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
5 "Jerusalem has been beseiged and conquered 37 times in the 4000 years of its his-
tory." M. BENVENISTI, JERUSALEM: THE TORN CITY VII (1976). See generally, R.V. Lucy. Je-
rusalem: The Holy City, INT'L PERSPECTIVES (Mar-Apr. 1978); Y. TEKOAH, Barbed Wire
Shall Not Return to Jerusalem, in CRESCENT AND STAR, 263-65 (Y. ALEXANDER & N. Kirrra.
EDS. 1973).
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reigned over the "Chosen People,"' the Romans crucified Jesus,7 and the
Prophet Muhammad bore the thoughts of Islam.' As a result, the city of
Jerusalem has remained central to the cultures of Judaism, Christianity
and Islam as a historic and holy city.
In addition to the direct religious connections Jerusalem has with the
three monolithic faiths, the city also lies in the forefront of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Israel, Jordan and Arab Palestinians claim sovereignty
over the city of Jerusalem, and as a result, none of the parties is willing to
negotiate a peace settlement until the status of Jerusalem is resolved.9
This obstinance, however, is not merely the end result of political hostil-
ity; it also reflects a process in which Jews and Arabs have each fused the
images of Jerusalem as a holy city and as a national capital into one polit-
ical concept. 10
To understand this process, is to realize that Jerusalem is not just a
piece of real estate subject to the nationalistic goals of conquest and
reconquest. Clearly, nationalism is involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict
over Jerusalem, but the struggle is more than pure devotion to one's na-
tion. Religion is an intricate part of their nationalism. As a result, Jerusa-
lem remains central to the relationship of Zionism to Judaism, and Arab
nationalism to Islam." To the Jews, Jerusalem represents the core of Er-
etz Israel.12 It physically stands as a memory to the divine covenant be-
tween God and man as the home of the Holy Temple. 13 To the Arabs,
Jerusalem symbolizes the universality of Islam. 4 In it, stands the Dome
I Jews consider Jerusalem a holy city because it was their political and religious center
in Biblical times. Circa 1000 B.C. King David established Jerusalem as the capital city of
the Israelite tribes. King Solomon, David's son, built the first holy temple of the Jews in the
city.
, Christians recognize Jerusalem as a holy city because Jesus was crucified there and
much of his life evolved around the city.
I See W. WATT, MOHAMMAD: PROPHET AND STATESMAN (1961). Muslims believe Muham-
mad rose to heaven from Jerusalem making it the third holiest city after Mecca and Medina
in Saudi Arabia.
9 See notes 71-73 infra, and accompanying text.
10 Pfaff, supra note 4, at 1020.
H. Lazaris-Yafeh, The Sanctity of Jerusalem in Islam, in JERUSALEM (J. Oester-
reicher & A. Sinai eds. 1974); S. Talman, The Biblical Concept of Jerusalem, in JERUSALEM
(J. Osterreicher & A. Sinai eds 1974); Tibarwi, Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab
History, 14 THE ARAB WORLD 9-22 (Special ed. 1968).
12 "Jerusalem is at the center of the land (Eretz) of Israel, the Temple is at the center
of Jerusalem, the Holy of Holies is at the center of the Temple, the Ark is at the center of
the Holy of Holies and the foundation stone is in front of the Ark, which point is the foun-
dation of the World." Reprinted in A. Hertzberg, JUDAISM (1963).
13 See note 6 supra. The Wailing Wall is what is left of the courtyard wall of the second
temple destroyed in 70 AD.
" Bassiouni, Islam: Concept, Law and World Habeas Corpus, 2 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.
REV. 160 (1969).
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of the Rock15 on the spot from where Muhammad was believed to have
ascended briefly to heaven, immortalizing Jerusalem as the third city sa-
cred to the Muslims.18
These different religious formulations are intertwined tightly with
the political doctrines of Zionism and Arab nationalism respectively."
Consequently, the nationalistic concept of a strong state"' has been trans-
formed from a secular principle into a sacred one. To be sovereign over
Jerusalem is not merely to be in possession of land; to be sovereign over
Jerusalem is to own and protect treasures from a period of past religious
enlightenment sacred to one's cultural heritage, and concomitantly, to
one's national pride. 9 Jerusalem is in the center of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, because possession of it symbolizes the success of one national
dream and political doctrine, while failure to possess it is evidence of a
lost dream and political doctrine destroyed.20
The religious-national underpinnings of the quest for the city suggest
that the disposition of title to Jerusalem would not guarantee a peaceful
settlement. Moreover, it seems probable that the loser in a judicial deter-
mination of sovereignty would disregard any judgment that was detri-
mental to its position.21 As a result, the importance of the need for sover-
eignty determination shifts from the position of establishing clear and
distinct boundaries resulting in the conclusion of conflict, to the position
of establishing for the rightful sovereign of Jerusalem, legal justification
for remaining in possession by military strength.22 This shift in priorities,
however, also provides the weaker military opponent with the opportu-
" The Dome of the Rock stands near the Wailing Wall. It was built over the rock from
which, according to Muslim belief, Muhammad rose to heaven with the angel Gabriel and
spoke with God. With God's blessing, Muhammed returned from his night's journey to
spread Islam, the new religion. Jews believe that on this rock, Abraham, the leader of the
ancient Hebrews, prepared to sacrifice his son, Isaac, at God's command.
"6 See note 8 supra.
17 See N. Feinberg, The Recognition of the Jewish People in International Law, in I.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 59 (J. Moore ed. 1974); Seminar of Arab Jurists On Palestine,
Algiers, July 22-27, 1967, The Palestine Question, reprinted in I THE ARAB-ISRAELI CON-
FLICT 253 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
18 For excellent background material see S.G. HAIM, ARAB NATIONALISM, AN ANTHOLOGY
(1962); A. GAL, SOCIALIST-ZIONISM (1973) (Theory and Issues in Contemporary Jewish
Nationalism).
19 Id. See note 12 supra, and note 117, infra.
20 "The central issue underlying the entire conflict, then, is Zionism versus Arab na-
tionalism. The two doctrines are, in their original form, irreconcilable. . . Arabs and Zion-
ists are suspicious and fearful of each other, and coexistence cannot be envisioned by either
as long as such positions are maintained." Bassiouni and Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Conflict-
Real and Apparent Issues: An Insight Into Its Future From The Lessons of the Past, 44
ST. JOHNS L. REv. 399, 409 (1970).
21 Furthermore, the religious and historical claims of sovereignty to Jerusalem suggest
that the interested parties consider Jerusalem as a separate tract of land, distinct and
unique from the West Bank.
29 A. GERSON ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (1978).
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nity to exploit his adversary's military strength to the international com-
munity by simultaneously exploiting his position as the underdog. By way
of propaganda and international pressure, the weaker military contender
can transform his adversary's legal justification for military might into a
travesty of abusive military control. The end result of this transformation
is that it will undermine the legitimate sovereign of Jerusalem by divest-
ing it of its military strength.
Israel is now in possession of the city of Jerusalem, and although
Israel has just formally annexed the city, past Israeli actions suggested
otherwise, and have been subject to international debate.2 8 The thesis of
this note is that Israel is the legitimate sovereign of Jerusalem because
the Israeli claim under international law is superior to that of either Jor-
dan or the Palestinian Arabs.2 ' This superior claim will establish Israel's
legal right to Jerusalem, but it will not establish peace between the ad-
verse parties because of the importance of Jerusalem in the Islamic
scheme of nationalism.2 5 As a result, only Israel's military superiority26
will allow Israel to retain sovereignty over Jerusalem. The Palestinian
Arabs and Jordan, as the weaker military opponents, will continue to at-
tempt to shift world public opinion against Israel. In doing so they hope
to undermine Israel's military superiority and sovereign position in their
attempt to satisfy their sacred claim.
If the establishment of amicable bonds between Israel and its neigh-
bors is the ultimate issue in the Middle Eastern conflict, then the end
result is that Israel must induce its enemy into negotiation. Legal sover-
eignty allows Israel to proceed at its own pace. This article will review the
legal significance of historical events from the end of the Ottoman control
over Palestine in 1917 through the present and will examine the legal cri-
teria needed to formulate claims of sovereignty in international law. It
will then proceed to show how the established legal criteria is inapplicable
to the status of Jerusalem and will suggest an alternative means of legal
interpretation. This article concludes that Israel is sovereign over Jerusa-
lem pursuant to international law, but that its sovereignty will not bring
2 See note 145 infra.
See sec. IV infra.
25 See S. HAIM, supra note 18; M.KERR, THE ARAB COLD WAR (1971).
2' See A. GERSON, supra note 22.
27 Some will argue that the history of Jerusalem's legal status cannot begin in the early
20th century but must begin by examining its history 4000 years ago. Because Turkey had
control over Jerusalem for approximately 400 years and was the last recognized sovereign to
control the area before it became subject to a mandate, it is presumed that Turkey had clear
legal title to Palestine.
Although Jews and Palestinians claim historical connections to the area dating back to
biblical time, these claims are generally asserted to supplement modern claims to the land.
For a discussion of history as a source of territorial sovereignty, see 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1224 (1963); N. HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND RELATIONS 81-90 (1945).
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NOTES
about an end to hostilities. Sovereignty provides Israel with justification
for military force and legitimate grounds to establish a framework for fu-
ture negotiations for peace to its liking. In conclusion this article provides
a framework for future negotiation.
IL HISTORY
A historical review of the legal status of Jerusalem can begin with
events primarily after World War 1.27 The land known as Palestine,
'2 8
which included the city of Jerusalem, was under the sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire for nearly 400 years, from 1517 to 1917.2 9 In October
1914, however, the Turks made the mistake of joining the Central Powers
who were defeated in World War 1.30 The Turks lost control of Jerusalem
and their vast empire.3 1 Turkey officially renounced all of its rights and
title to the land of Palestine in the Treaty of Lausanne, 2 to the benefit of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, who in turn, consented to the
League of Nations granting a Mandates3 over Palestine, with Great Brit-
ain as its mandatory power.
A. The League of Nations
Before an examination of the Palestine Mandate, a brief review of
three promises made during the War is necessary. In 1915, in order to
prevent the Arabs from joining the Turks against the Allied forces, Brit-
ain's High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, corresponded
with Sheriff Hussein of Hejaz in Mecca, promising him Arab indepen-
dence 4 in return for Arab cooperation. Hussein accepted McMahon's
28 Before the Palestine Mandate was established, Palestine had no fixed geographical
meaning. The political and legal definition for Palestine was fixed by the Palestine
Mandate.
29 Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, in I THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 929,
930 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
30 Great Britain wanted to conquer the Ottoman Empire to gain control over the Suez
Canal and to halt any threats to its shipping link with India. F. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI
DILEMMA 7 (1976).
31 Turkey's empire was carved up into the Mandates of Syria and Lebanon, Mesopota-
mia, and Palestine. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, reprinted in III DOCUMENTS: THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT 71 (J. Moore ed. 1974) art. 22.
32 Article 16 of the Treaty provides as follows: "Turkey hereby renounces all rights and
title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in
the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized
by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled
by the parties concerned." Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12. See Feinburg,
The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, in I THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 386, 414
(J. Moore ed. 1974); Feinburg, The Question of Sovereignty Over Palestine, in I THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT 225, 234 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
32 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (5th ed. 1967).
3' The pertinent passage of the letter was as follows: "England to acknowledge the in-
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promise and declared war on the Turks. These letters are known as the
McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. 5
In May, 1916, Britain made another promise and signed the secret
Sykes-Picot agreement 8 with France which seemingly abrogated the Mc-
Mahon promise. France was to be given the Mediterranean coast north of
Haifa, which was the area known as Celicia (Syria and Lebanon). Britain
was to get Mesopotamia, (Iraq), while the future of Palestine was to be
determined by Britain, France and Russia.37
As a result of these conflicting promises, Great Britain set the stage
for the future battle over Palestine. The Arabs contended at the Paris
Peace Conference,8 that Palestine was promised to them in the McMa-
hon-Hussein Correspondence. Britain, however, represented by Sir Win-
ston Churchill, officially rejected that view and contended that "[Sir Mc-
Mahon's] promise was given subject to a reservation made3 9 . . .which
excluded from its scope . . . the portion of Syria lying to the west of the
district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by his
Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the Indepen-
dent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was
thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.''  King Faisal, son of
Sheriff Hussein, was willing to recognize the Balfour Declaration and the
Zionist interest in Palestine, as long as he could have an independent
state in Damascus.41 Yet, France, which was not bound by the McMahon
dependence of the Arab countries bounded on the North by Mersina and Adana up to the
37 of latitude .. " And in a later letter, "the portions of Syria lying to the west of the
Districts of Damascas, Horns, Hana, and Aleppo ... should be excluded from the proposed
limits and boundaries." Reprinted in PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, 17-19 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as COMMISSION REPORT].
35 Id. See Bassiouni & Fisher, supra note 20, at 429.
36 VI DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939, 244, 245-47 (First Series
1952).
3' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 21. See H. Bovis, THE JERUSALEM QUESTION 1-
6 (1971).
"8 "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a na-
tional home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or
the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The Balfour Declara-
tion, Nov. 2, 1917, reprinted in, III DOCUMENTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 32 (J. Moore
ed. 1974). See also COMMISSIoN REPORT, supra note 34, at 22.
39 Id.
10 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
I On January 3, 1919, Faisal entered into an accord with Chaim Weizmann, President
of the World Zionists officially acknowledging the Balfour Declaration and agreed that "[a]U
necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Pal-
estine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land
through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. . . ." The Faisal-Weizmann
Vol. 12:169
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Promise, opposed King Faisal's proposal and expelled him from Syria.
This expulsion led to a Palestinian rejection of the Balfour Declaration.
The Arab-Palestinians argued in their attempt to establish exclusive
claim to Palestine, that "at no time did the British Government as the
author of such declaration possess any right of sovereignty over Palestine,
whether on the date on which the Balfour Declaration was made or at any
time thereafter,42 which could have enabled it to recognize any rights of
the Jewish People in or over Palestine.' 43 The same argument, however,
can be attributed to the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence which was
made while Turkey still possessed title in Palestine.4 4 Furthermore, the
argument is specious because it was neither the Balfour Declaration nor
the Hussein-McMahon Coorespondence that became the effective legal
instrument in determining the future of Palestine; the Mandate for Pales-
tine, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, became the effective le-
gal instrument.
45
The Palestine Mandate, created "for the purpose of giving effect to
the provisions of Article 2241 of the Covenant of the League of Nations"
7
Agreement, reprinted in III DOCUMENTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 39 (J. Moore ed.
1974). But see Bassiouni & Fisher, supra note 20, at 435-36.
42 After Turkey ceded her title rights to Britain as an Allied Power, arguably Britain
could have ceded her territory to anyone of her choice subject to the approval of the rest of
the Allied Powers.
41 Cattan, Sovereignty Over Palestine, in I THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 191, 204 (J.
Moore ed. 1974).
" All of Britain's Agreements were entered into pendent bello. Britain could not act on
any promise she made until Turkey ceded her rights. Turkey did so on July 24, 1923 in the
Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 32. See Note, Jurisdiction over Palestine-An analysis of
the Conflicting Arab-Israeli Claims of Legal Title, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 273
(1978).
" Feinburg, The Question of Sovereignty Over Palestine, supra note 32, at 241-43.
48 "According to Article 22, the Mandate System consisted of three different types of
Mandate, covering 'certain communities belonging to the Turkish Empire.' Although certain
territories are specifically referred to in Article 22 paragraphs defining the different types of
Mandate, Palestine is not included in any of the paragraphs. [P]alestine. . .therefore did
not fall within the guidelines of any of the three enumerated types of mandate [and so] the
Palestine Mandate would not have the same legal effect as a qualified mandate under the
Mandate System." Note, supra note 44, at 288. See, Comment, International Law-
Trusteeship Compared with Mandate, 49 MICH. L. REv. 1199, 1199, n.2 (1951). But see H.
CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1973). Cattan supports the Arab contention
that Palestine was one of the countries whose independence was "provisionally recognized"
and therefore, under the provisions of a class A Mandate which was subject only to the
administrative advice and assistance of the Mandatory. See also, Palestine Mandate, art. 1,
giving the Mandatory "full powers of legislation and of administration." Palestine Mandate,
Terms of League of Nations Mandate, U.N. Doc. A/70, 2-7 (Oct. 1946), reprinted in III
DOCUMENTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 75-84 (J. Moore ed. 1974). Class B Mandates were
created for Central African territories. They covered territories at that stage of civilization
where the "Mandatory must be responsible for administration of the territory subject to
1980
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reads in pertinent part:
[T]he Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the decla-
ration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the government of his
Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said powers, in favour of the es-
tablishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People...
[and recognition should be given] to the historical connection of the Jew-
ish people with Palestine and . . [flor reconstituting 8 their national
home in that country. [N]othing should be done which might prejudice
the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine.49
Great Britain, resigned to comply with its mandated duty, tried to
balance its relationship with both Arabs and Jews and strained to main-
tain Jewish and Arab rights in Palestine. Britain's administrative at-
tempts were self-defeating. It was responsible for the existing enigma in
Palestine and was obliged to suffer for this political shortsightedness dur-
ing the war throughout the period of mandate. England became the tar-
get of animosity as the inter-ethnic struggle erupted between the Arabs
and the Jews for control over Palestine and Jerusalem.
B. The United Nations50
At the conclusion of World War II, the United Nations was formed
and the League of Nations terminated. 51 The League did not officially
convey its mandatory rights and powers to the United Nations but
adopted a resolution at its final session which noted the dissolution of its
mandatory functions. The resolution did, however, state that Chapter XI,
XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations corresponded to the
principles embodied in Article 22 of the League's Covenant and that it
was the League's intention that the administering countries continue
certain conditions... ." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 31, art. 22, para. 5.
Class C Mandates of South-West Africa were administered by the Mandatory power as inte-
gral parts of its territory subject only to certain safeguards for the indigenous population.
Id. para. 6.
11 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 31, art. 22. See also L. SOHN, BASIc Docu-
MENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 295, 301-02 (2d ed. 1968).
11 "Reconstituting" implies the Jews had a biblical right to the land of Palestine. For
the effect of historical claims in international law see 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 2 at 1224-
29; N. HILL, supra note 27.
" Palestine Mandate, supra note 46, at 75. It is to be noted that in accordance with
Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine, England removed, with the League's approval, the
areas of Trans-Jordan from the area open to the Jews, establishing Faisal's brother Abdul-
lab as its Emir. Terms of League of Nations Mandates, supra note 46 at 2-7. Cf. note 114
infra.
"0 The legal competence of the United Nations to determine the future of Palestine is
discussed infra at sec. IV(C).
" See note 191 infra.
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their mandated function "until other arrangements have been agreed be-
tween the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers.""2
Great Britain, however, no longer able to deal with the growing dis-
sention between the Arabs and the Jews, submitted the problem of Pales-
tine to the United Nations in 1947.5s
C. The Partition Plan54
The United Nations, faced with an arduous problem as to the ar-
rangements over Palestine, considered numerous proposals in its attempt
to be just.5 5 On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly approved s a
resolution to partition Palestine.57 The plan called for: a termination of
the Mandate by August 1, 1948; a division of Palestine into an Arab state
and a Jewish state delineated by the boundaries in the resolution; eco-
nomic union between the two states; and the internationalization of the
82 [1946-1947] Y.B.U.N. 575.
1 The United Nations could make recommendations to Britain pursuant to Article 10
of its Charter. It provides as follows: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or
any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions
of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may
make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or
to both on any such questions or matters." U.N. CHARTER, art. 10. The United Nation's
ability to do more than simply recommend a solution for Palestine is discussed infra at sec.
IV(C).
5' The binding effect of the Partition Plan on all interested parties is discussed infra at
sec. IV(D).
5 The United Nations accepted the Partition Plan developed by its Special Committee
on Palestine (UNISCOP). Delegates from Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala,
India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia constituted the UNIS-
COP Commission. UNISCOP actually proposed two plans to the General Assembly. The
minority plan of August 31, 1947, provided that Palestine be transformed into an indepen-
dent federal state composed of a Jewish province and an Arab province within a three year
transition period. Jerusalem was to become the federal capital divided into two separate
municipalities. The Jewish municipality would predominantly include West Jerusalem, and
the Arab municipality, predominantly East Jerusalem. The Holy Places in the city were to
be governed by a permanent international body. The plan was rejected by the Jewish
Agency which favored the majority plan calling for the partition of Palestine into an Arab
state and a Jewish state with a corpus separatum administered by the United Nations over
Jerusalem. The Arabs were only interested in an Arab state over all of Palestine and re-
jected both plans. H. Bovis, supra note 37, at 41-48.
11 In favor: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Belorussia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, South
Africa, Sweden, the Ukraine, the U.S.S.R., the United States, Uruguay, Venezeula. Against:
Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Turkey, Yemen.Abstention: Argentina, Chile, China, Columbia, El Salvador, Ethio-
pia, Honduras, Mexico, The United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.
57 G.A. Ras. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
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city of Jerusalem" The Jewish Agency5" agreed to the resolution; the
Palestinians rejected it. The Palestinians were of the opinion that their
rights to self-determination were denied. 0
D. After Partition
Consequently, on May 14, 1948, when the, Palestinian Mandate was
terminated and Israel simultaneously declared its state of independence,6 1
five Arab countries invaded,6 2 "with the declared purpose of liquidating
the newly-born Jewish state."6 3 By way of the 1948 Arab incursion, Jor-
58 Id. The internationalization of the city of Jerusalem is discussed at length infra at
sec. IV(G).
" The Jewish Agency was "recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and
cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters
as may affect the Jewish national home and the interests of Jewish population in Palestine."
The Palestine Mandate, supra note 46, art. 4. The Jews were not entirely content with the
Partition Plan especially as to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Internationalization,
however, was considered a better alternative than continued fighting in the city. Moreover,
because the draft proposal of the Partition Plan authorized a referendum to change the
status of Jerusalem in ten years, the Jews believed that Jerusalem, would be international-
ized entity only for that stated period. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 4.
10 The principle of self-determination and its validity as a legal argument against the
United Nations Partition Plan is discussed at length infra at sec. IV(B).
" Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948, I LAWS OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 3-5 (1948), reprinted in III ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 348 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
62 The countries were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. According to Yehuda
Blum, these same countries "had actively supported, trained, financed, and equipped the
Arab guerrilla forces operating in Palestine, with a view to frustrating the United Nations
partition plan (in fact, a large proportion of the persons engaged in those guerilla activities
had been of non-Palestinian stock) . . . ." Y. BLUM, THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM
10-11 (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, 1974). When Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and
Lebanon attacked the new Israeli state Bernadotte proposed that the original Palestine
Mandate of Trans-Jordan and Palestine, be transformed into a union of two members, one
Arab and one Jewish. The Arabs would control the Negev while the Galilee would be a part
of the Jewish territory. As for Jerusalem, it would be under Arab control subject to munici-
pal autonomy for the Jewish community. The Israeli Provisional Government rejected the
plan as did the Arab League. Jordan, however, favored it. In September 1948, Bernadotte
tried again with a revised plan. This time he called for maximum local autonomy by the
Jewish and Arab communities, and for the city of Jerusalem, to be under the control of the
United Nations. Both the Arabs and Israel rejected the plan. As a result, the First Commit-
tee of the United Nations General Assembly ignored the proposal. See Progress Report of
the United Nations Mediator on Palestine Submitted to the Secretary-General for Trans-
mission to the Members of the U.N., 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/648 (1948);
Palestine-Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, G.A. Res. 194(Im), 3 U.N.
GAOR 21-25, U.N.Doc. A/807 (1948). See H. Bovis, supra note 37, at 59-60; BENEVENISTI,
supra note 5, at 5.
63 Y. BLUM, supra note 62. On April 22, 1948, King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan called on
"all Arab countries to join my armies in a movement to Palestine to return the Arab charac-
ter of that country when the British end their Mandatory rule on 15 May." Reprinted in J.
MARLOWE, THE SEAT OF PILATE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE 246 (1959).
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dan64 seized the west bank of the Jordan River and Eastern Jerusalem,
while Israeli forces moved beyond the boundaries of the partition resolu-
tion in order to protect 5 their newly established state and the existing
Jewish communities in Jerusalem. On August 2, 1948, the Israeli Provi-
sional Government declared Western Jerusalem to be Israeli-occupied
territory.66
On April 3, 1949, Israel and Jordan signed an armistice agreement.67
Article 11(2) of that agreement provides that "no provision . . . shall in
any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either Party hereto
in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provi-
sions of this agreement being dictated exclusively by military considera-
tions."68 The effect of the agreement was to freeze the rights and claims
of the concerned parties-Jordan and Israel. On April 24, 1950, however,
Jordan annexed East Jerusalem and the West Bank.69
Jerusalem, a divided city for seventeen years, was reunited in 1967
when war exploded in the Middle East once again. After Egypt attacked
Israel, Israel advised Jordan not to enter the war, and stated that if her
request were honored, Israel would not initiate any fighting against Jor-
dan. Jordan, however, joined the war on June 5, 1967.70 Within seven
days, Israel had captured all of Jerusalem.
Since the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has had control
over West Jerusalem as well as East Jerusalem. Protection of the Holy
64 In 1949 the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was changed to the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan to reflect the merger of Trans-Jordan and the West Bank. 2 M. WHrrE-
MAN, supra note 27, at 1165.
e' See generally, Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "'Para- War" and Peace in the Middle
East, 44 ST. JOHN L. REv. 466 (1970); Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-
Defence, 6 ISRAEL L. Rsv. 65 (1971).
"' Israel's occupation of West Jerusalem is discussed at length, infra at sec. III(C).
'7 General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Israel-Jordan, 42 U.N.T.S. 303.
:8 Id. at 306.
6' 2 M. WHITEMAN supra note 27, at 1165. The issue of Jordan's annexation of East
Jerusalem is discussed at length infra at sec. III(B) and IV(F).
70 According to General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervi-
sion Organization, on the morning of June 5, 1967, the following occurred: "I was summoned
to the Israeli Foreign Ministry and on arrival at about 9 a.m., I was asked to convey a
message to King Hussein and the Jordanian Government. It amounted to the following. if
Jordan remained passive during the war, Israel would do nothing. On the other hand, if
Jordan joined Egypt, Israel would use all means in its power to fight Jordan. The message
was conveyed through our cease-fire apparatus. As far as I can understand, it reached King
Hussein at 10:30 a.m. and the exchange of fire in Jerusalem started about an hour later."
Reprinted in Y. BLUM, supra note 62 at 19 n.54; Jordan argues that it entered the war as an
ally to Egypt and was justified in doing so because Jordan and Egypt were acting in collec-
tive self defense pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. For an assessment of
Jordanian claims see Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in
the West Bank, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 15 (1973).
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Places has been guaranteed by the State of Israel,71 and the Israeli gov-
ernment has continued to endorse a policy that the Holy Places in Jeru-
salem belong to those who hold them sacred. Jordan, however, had re-
fused to negotiate with the State of Israel until Israel returns to pre-1967
borders.7 2 The Palestinians refuse to even recognize the existence of the
State of Israel.7
III. METHODS OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
To establish the necessary link between historical facts and interna-
tional law in determining the legal status of Jerusalem, general methods
of acquisition of territory must be examined.7 4 The international law con-
cept of territorial sovereignty 5 anticipates that territory may be acquired
by traceable claims of title alone or by other recognized means, such as
7' The Protection of Holy Places Law of 1967, provides that Holy Places shall be pro-
tected from desecration, harm or violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom
of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their
feelings with regard to those places. Any desecration or violation renders the offender liable
to imprisonment for a term of seven years. Any violation of the freedom of access of the
members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard
to those places shall render the offender liable to imprisonment for a term of five years. Law
of June 27, 1967, [5727-1967] Knesset no. 26 (Israel). 21 Laws of the State of Israel 76.
72 Jordan interprets U.N. Resolution 242 to mean that Israel must return Jerusalem to
Jordan. In 1974, King Hussein stated: "There can be no compromise. The return of Arab
sovereignty over the Arab city of Jerusalem, over the Arab section of Jerusalem which was
conquered in 1967, is a basic requirement. There can be no peace so long as the Israelis are
in control of the whole of Jerusalem." Reprinted in, BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 362.
73 See note 99 infra.
74 For a general discussion of sovereignty claims see 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at
1028; G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 398 (1940); G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 33, at 64-78. Cf., Note, supra note 44, at 274-78; Note, Israel: Conqueror, Libera-
tor or Occupier Within the Context of International Law, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 206, 207-16
(1975).
75 Because sovereignty is a vague term in international law many have tried to define
its meaning. For the purpose of this note, sovereignty will be considered the most absolute
power of control given to a state. The term sovereignty includes a concept of defined terri-
tory which allows state control over specific territory, and the juristic concept which allows a
state to determine the limits of its jurisdiction and the power to promulgate its laws.
Sovereignty may change as a result of a change in territorial control. This note concen-
trates primarily on the concept of territorial change in sovereignty and the power that flows
to a sovereignty holder. Although similar, the term title here should be equated with the
concept of territorial sovereignty rather than the domestic concept of deeded title in prop-
erty law. See generally W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
81-96 (1964); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). "[A]I
that can be required of a state is that it should not overstep the limits which international
law places upon its jurisdiction; within those limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests
upon its sovereignty." The S.S. Lotus [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10 at 19.
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prescription, cession, conquest, occupation and annexation.78 These meth-
ods are explored below.
Prescription is the process whereby one legal sovereign loses claim to
its territory by the territorial occupation of another sovereign when pro-
test against the presence of the occupying state is not made within a rea-
sonable period of time.77 The occupying state will gain title to the terri-
tory in question if its possession was of sufficient duration, undisturbed,
open and sufficiently active.78 As a result, the issues generally arising
under a claim of prescription are factual ones. For example, whether the
legal sovereign protested the presence of an occupying state within a rea-
sonable time; or whether the occupying state's possession of territory was
long and uninterrupted.
Cession is the process in which a present sovereign transfers its terri-
torial title to a new sovereign pursuant to an agreement between the two
states.79 Generally, cession will occur after a war where the victor pres-
sures the losing state to legalize the outcome of the war by entering into
an agreement of cession with the victor.8 0 A legitimate cession will be
recognized when the ceding state had clear title and apparent authority
to effect a transfer.8 "
Conquest is the process in which one state takes the territory of an-
other state by force.8 2 To achieve title, however, "debellatio83 plus subju-
gation traditionally exercised through annexation"8 " is required. Although
different interpretations 5 exist as to the exact requirements of debellatio,
transfer of title will occur "if the conquered territory is effectively re-
duced to possession and annexed by the conquering state."88 This method
7' Territorial sovereignty may be derived, for example, by historic, strategic, or eco-
nomic claims. See N. HILL, supra note 27, at 35-52.
11 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 1062-84; Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in In-
ternational Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 332 (1950).
71 2 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 27, at 1062. Israel's occupation of Jerusalem and the
West Bank is not uncontested. Although Israeli presence has been long, it is unlikely that
title by prescription will ever result.
71 Id. at 1088. Note, supra note 44, at 274-75.
80 E.g., Turkey ceded its sovereignty rights in Palestine to the Allied Powers, see notes
32 & 42 supra.
"' Whether the Palestinians ceded their sovereignty rights in their Arab state to Jordan
remains an open question. See sec. IV(F) infra.
12 2 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 27, at 1111. Cf., Kunz, The Status of Occupied Germany
under International Law: A Legal Dilemma, 3 W. POL. Q. 538, 551 (1950).
" Debellatio will occur when an enemy's international personality is destroyed. Gerson,
supra note 70, at 6 n.16. Debellatio means the "extinction of the international personality of
a State by the destruction of the state machinery. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 33, at
630.
2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 1111.
6 Id.
68 Kunz, supra note 82, at 552-53 & n. 74. 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 74, at 427.
NOTES1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
of acquiring territorial sovereignty, however, remains suspect today, be-
cause it is in direct violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
ter87 and the equitable principle in international law of ex injuria jus non
oritur88
Occupation is the process in which a state acquires title by occupying
a res nullius5s Land may be considered res nullius "either because no
one has ever appropriated it-as in the case of newly found land-or be-
cause, though once appropriated, it has subsequently been abandoned." 90
Examples of territoria nullius include "(1) uninhabited lands . . . . (2)
[l]ands inhabited by individuals who are not permanently united for po-
litical action. (3) [1lands which have been abandoned by their former oc-
cupants. (4) [1]ands which have been forfeited because they have not been
occupied effectively." 9' Whether the land is in fact res nullius or whether
an acquiring state has in fact established an effective occupation, are is-
sues which often arise in this area. "The inability of the former power to
exercise sovereignty over the area in question and the effectiveness of
control exercised by the occupying power"92 are factors that will aid in
the determination of these issues.
The occupying power will generally annex the territory in question
by incorporating it in its jurisdictional scope. Annexation" is the process
by which an occupying power makes a unilateral declaration that it con-
siders the occupied territory its own, because all rights of sovereignty
have been transferred to it. Accordingly, an annexation will generally be
recognized if the occupying state establishes that its occupancy is legiti-
mate because the land it occupies is res nullius, or because its conquest is
debellatio.
Another method of acquisition entitled to international recognition is
87 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states that "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, art. 2(4).
18 The principle forbids states from acquiring legal rights from unilateral acts not rec-
ognized in international law. "[Wihen the act alleged to be creative of a new right is in
violation of an existing rule of customary or conventional International Law. . . the act in
question is tainted with invalidity and incapable of producing legal results beneficial to the
wrongdoer in the form of new title or otherwise." 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 75, at 141-42.
See Gerson supra note 70, at 5.
89 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 1030.
90 Id. Res nullius means "[tlhe property of nobody. A thing which has no owner, either
because a former owner has finally abandoned it, or because it has never been appropriated
by any person, or because (in the Roman law) it is not susceptible of private ownership."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1968); Note, supra note 74, at 208.
9 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 74, at 396-97.
92 Note, supra note 74, at 209.
03 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 1162.
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belligerent occupation . 4 A belligerent occupant acquires control over for-
eign territory as the consequence of war, but is not automatically vested
with sovereignty. His occupation is legally valid.until a peace treaty is
signed with the ousted sovereign. 5 The belligerent occupant, however,
can acquire sovereign rights to the land he occupies if such rights are
ceded to him by way of the peace treaty; or if a peace treaty does not
materialize, he can acquire sovereignty to the land he occupies if he can
effect debellatio or prescription. 9 Until a belligerent occupation formally
ceases to exist, the belligerent occupant is obligated to retain the ousted
sovereign's laws pursuant with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations 7 and
Article 47 of the 1949 Geneva Convention. s
All of these methods of acquisition of territory and sovereignty are
relevant to the present examination of the legal status of Jerusalem be-
cause of the nature of the Palestinian, Jordanian and Israeli claims to
Palestine. Each claim finds support in the analysis used to interpret the
League of Nations Mandate System and the effect it had in establishing
rights of sovereignty. Whether historical events succeeding the initiation
of the Mandate in Palestine are relevant in effecting a legal determina-
tion of the status of Jerusalem, depends upon the original interpretation
used to define the scope of rights delegated by the Palestine Mandate.
A. The Palestinian Position"
The Palestinians' primary argument for the right to control Jerusa-
A. McNAR, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 319 (3d ed. 1948). See also, Gerson, War,
Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the Contemporary International Legal
System, 18 HARV. INTL L.J. 525 (1977).
" Gerson, supra note 94.
'4Id.
Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), signed Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.S. No. 539, 100 BRaIT & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 338 (1919). "[T]he authority of the legitimate
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore and insure as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented the laws in force in the country." Id. art. 43.
"4 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. "Protected persons who
are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of
the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the. result of the occu-
pation of a territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occu-
pied territories and the Occupying power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole
of part of the occupied territory. Id. art. 47(3).
"' The Palestinian position is generally uniform among Palestinians. What is not clear,
however, is which faction of the Palestinians would serve as representative in future negotia-
tions with Israel or Jordan. Presumably, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will
serve as the representative. At the Arab Summit conference in Rabat, Morocco in October
1974, the assembled Arab delegations recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of
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lem is that the city is geographically located within the province of Pales-
tine.100 As the original inhabitants of Palestine 10 1-as it existed before
Turkey ceded it to'012 the Principal Allied Powers in World War I-the
Palestinians claim exclusive sovereignty to all of Palestine." Support for
their claim, however, did not emanate from the traditional methods of
acquiring territory and title recognized in customary international law,1°4
but rather developed as an outgrowth of President Wilson's principles of
non-annexation and self-determination. 105 The Palestinians argued that
the Palestinian people. See Time, Nov. 11, 1974, at 27. Moreover, in 1974, the General As-
sembly invited the PLO to participate in Middle East debates, and in January 1976, the
Security Council allowed the seating of the PLO, as if a representative of a state, despite
United States objection. See, A. GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
207 (1978); H. CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37 (2d ed. 1976).
Although the PLO has gained considerable support as the bargaining agent for the Pal-
estinian people in the last few years, it is important to understand that the PLO is not a
"monolithic body speaking with one voice. It is rather an umbrella organization composed of
groups, factions and personalities representing a range of views. ... "
With the PLO there are nearly a dozen political parties-each with its own
armed unit. Arafat, leader of Al Fatah, which he founded in 1965, is Chairman of
the PLO's governing Fifteen-man executive committee. The executive committee
was elected from the 300 member Palestine National Council, a body that con-
venes annually. The executive is dominated by Fatah. Very generally, the remain-
der of the PLO can be divided into groups that support Fatah's leadership and
the 'rejectionists' who since 1974, have opposed what they claim is Arafat's eager-
ness to settle for half of Palestine. Led by Dr. George Habash's Popular Front For
the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) the rejectionist bloc has gained in political
influence since Anwar Sadat's November 1977 visit to Jerusalem. Garbus, The
Politics of the PLO, THE NATION, Nov. 3, 1979, at 427.
Israel, however, has never recognized the PLO as representatives of the Palestinians
because the organization denies Israel's right to exist. See The Palestinian National Charter
of 1968, arts. 9, 19, 22, reprinted in S. KADI, BASIC POLITICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ARMED
PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MovEMENT, No. 27 (Palestine Books, 1969). Accordingly, although
the PLO may represent the Palestinians, it does not mean necessarily the Israel will negoti-
ate with the PLO. It is possible that a faction of Palestinians not affiliated with any party in
the PLO could represent the Palestinian interest in possible future negotiations with Israel.
Cf. Hakabi, The Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and their Na-
tional Covenant (1968), in I THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 518 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
100 See H. CATTAN, supra note 99, at 11.
101 The Jews argue that they are the original inhabitants of Palestine. See Feinberg,
The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, supra note 32, at 406. For the Arab histori-
cal claim see H. CATTAN, supra note 99, at 3-12.
102 Some Palestinians argue that Turkey could not cede to the Allied Powers that which
did not belong to them. They argue that the Turkish empire was governed by both Pales-
tinians and Turks and that when Palestine was occupied by the British Army in 1917, sover-
eignty vested in the Palestinians. See Cattan, Sovereignty Over Palestine, in I THE ARAa-
ISRAELI CONFLICT 191, 193 (J. Moore ed. 1974). But see Feinberg, The Question of Sover-
eignty, supra note 32, at 231.
1o3 H. CATTAN, supra note 46, at 65-68.
104 See sec. III supra.
10" R. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD SETTLEMENT (1922). "To the Arabs,
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those principles were implicitly incorporated in the League of Nations
and Mandate System, requiring, therefore, that any interpretation of the
Palestine Mandate be within the overall spirit of that system.106 Thus,
the only legitimate interpretation of the Palestine Mandate that could
effectuate that spirit was that the sovereign right to Palestine be vested
exclusively in the Palestinian people, subject to the temporary adminis-
trative advice and assistance of the Mandatory Power and the League of
Nations.10 7 Any provisions in the Mandate, that recognized a Jewish
property interest in the land of Palestine, would be in direct violation of
Article 22 and therefore void. 08 Moreover, the Palestinians believed that
the advice of the Mandatory Power ceased to be a limitation on their
sovereign right to Palestine when the League of Nations became a de-
funct organization, and when the Mandatory Power relinquished its ad-
ministrative duties to the United Nations.0 9 Accordingly, the Palestini-
ans rejected the United Nations' competence to legally determine the
future government of Palestine, 0 and as a result refused to recognize the•
validity of the Partition Plan."' Their contention was that the United
Nations effectively denied them the right of self-determination by ac-
knowledging the existence of a Jewish interest in Palestine and by recog-
nizing the State of Israel as the culminating effect of that interest. The
Palestinians continue to deny the State of Israel any legal or historical
right to exist. 2
Alternatively, the Palestinians argue that even if they were to recog-
nize the State of Israel in the future, they will not acknowledge that
Israel has any territorial claim to the West Bank or the city of Jerusalem.
They will only recognize the territorial allotment provided to the Jewish
state in the United Nations Partition Plan."' s
the Mandate System was to be an attempt at a partial fulfillment of Allied, and especially
Wilsonian promises that an Allied victory would foster the principles of independence, self-
determination, and democracy based upon the will of the people. To the Arabs, all these
principles supported the cause of the majority-namely themselves in Palestine." F. KHOURI,
THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 12-13 (1976). See also Pomerance, The United States and Self-
Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1976).
210 See discussion of the Palestine Mandate as sui generis, infra at sec. IV(B).
107 Note, however, that Article 1 of the Palestine Mandate extended the Mandatory's
role in Palestine beyond "administrative advice and assistance." See note 46 supra.
103 H. CATTAN, supra note 46, at 65.
109 Id.
11 Id. at 69-89.
'" Id. "The Partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel
are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will
of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with
the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right of self
determination." The Palestinian National Charter of 1968, art. 19, supra note 99.
"I H. CATrAN, supra note 46, at 92.
M' The PLO has recently indicated that they might recognize the State of Israel if
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B. The Jordanian Position
The Jordanian claim to Jerusalem and the West Bank emanates from
its act of annexing the land after joining the Palestinians in 1948 in their
collective effort to thwart the existence of the State of Israel. Because
Jordan did not acquire any legal interest in any section of Palestine by
way of the Palestine Mandate, 14 it could only acquire legal sovereignty
from the preceding sovereignty holder in a manner similar to traditional
modes applicable to sovereign states-prescription, cession, conquest or
occupation. 1 5
Jordan adopts a three step analysis in fixing its sovereignty to the
West Bank and Jerusalem. First, Jordan recognized the Palestinian claim
of an exclusive right of sovereignty in Palestine, as the legitimate one."l6
This is supported by the fact that in 1948, after the establishment of the
State of Israel, Jordan came to the aid of the Palestinians and proclaimed
that the object of its intervention was to prevent Israel from usurping
Palestinian territory and abusing Palestinian rights.17 Second, the Pales-
Resolution 242 were changed to recognize Palestinian interests. Israel rejects any changes in
Resolution 242, U.N. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR. (1382d mtg.) 8, U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 1382
(1967). See Dinstein, supra note 65.
Resolution 242 lays down the guiding principles for "the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East," and confirms the right of Israel "to live in peace with
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force." Id. at 476-77. See Y.
BLUM, SECURE BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE (1971). See also note 123 infra. What is
unsual about the PLO's sudden interest to recognize the State of Israel, besides its political
implications, is that it undermines their legal argument of exclusive right to Palestine.
Israel's right to exist as a state is not just contrary to the Palestinian position but is recog-
nized by the Palestinians as a denial of the Palestinian position. By recognizing Israel, they
are in effect recognizing the legality of the United Nations Partition Plan.
114 The Palestine Mandate included the whole of historic Palestine east and west of the
Jordan River. On September 16, 1922, however, the League of Nations approved a British
proposal to separate Trans-Jordan from Palestine pursuant to Article 25 of the Mandate.
Trans-Jordan in 1950, became Jordan when the West Bank was allegedly annexed. A. GER-
SON, supra note 99, at 44. Some Jews argue that Trans-Jordan is the home of the Arab
Palestinian State because of Britain's intent to fulfil the McMahon-Hussein Correspon-
dence. "The field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was understood,
at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole historic Palestine and the Zionists
were seriously disappointed when Trans-Jordan was cut away from the field under Article
25. This was done . . . in obedience to the McMahon Pledge which was antecedent to the
Balfour Declaration." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, ch. II, para. 42(3).
"1 See sec. III supra.
116 See KHOURI, supra note 105, at 73. Arab Higher Committee Delegation, Why the
Arab States Entered Palestine, in A MIDDLE EAST READER 335 (I. Gendzier ed. 1969).
"I King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, in a cablegram to the Security Council, stated that
"[W]e were compelled to enter Palestine to protect unarmed Arabs against Massacres ...
We are aware of our national duty towards Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular
and also Nazareth and Bethlehem. . . ." Cablegram dated May 16, 1948 by King Abdullah
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc., S/748 (1948). But cf., the Ukranian representatives
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tinians ceded to Jordan their exclusive sovereignty to the land that they
were jointly able to keep from the Israeli fighting force in the 1948 war.
Jordan supports its claim of succession by virtue of three events: (a) the
West Bank Palestinians wanted to merge their territory with that of Jor-
dan and expressed that desire in a resolution drawn at the 1948 Jericho
Convention; 118 (b) seventy percent of eligible West Bank voters partici-
pated in the 1950 general elections calling for a joint parliament to re-
present Jordan and the West Bank; 19 (c) the fact that Jordan's presence
in the West Bank was peaceful and uninterrupted for the entire period of
its occupation.120 Third, Israel, as an aggressor-occupant 21 in the 1967
war did not acquire any title right in the West Bank and Jerusalem and
therefore must return the land to its rightful sovereign, Jordan.22
An anomaly does exist, however, in the fact that Jordan can circum-
vent the first step of its legal argument and still have a legitimate claim
to the West Bank. This circumvention allows Jordan the political mobil-
ity to change its hard line position not to recognize the State of Israel, to
a more moderate position in order to adapt if necessary, to the changing
political realities of Middle Eastern affairs encouraged by Anwar Sadat. 1 2
As a result, Jordan can opt to recognize the State of Israel without cloud-
ing Jordanian sovereignty claims and undermining the call for the return
of the West Bank to its sovereignty. 124
statement in the Security Council: "[I]t is known ... that according to the rules of the
international community each government has the right to restore order only in its own
territory ... [N]one of the States whose troops have entered Palestine can claim that Pal-
estine forms part of its territory. It is an altogether separate territory, without any relation-
ship to the territories of the States which have sent their troops into Palestine." U.N. SCOR
(292d mtg.) 25 (1948); U.N. SCOR (297th mtg.) 5 (1948).
18 See 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 1165, Gerson, supra note 70, at 9.
119 Id.
120 Id. Jordan's latter claim seems to be more relevant to Prescription rather than ces-
sion. See sec. III supra.
121 An aggressor occupant is one who violates article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
and the customary international law principle of ex injuria jus non oritur. See Gerson,
supra note 70, at 3-7. See also notes 87-88 supra & 213 infra.
122 Dr. Blum argues that Jordan has no reversionary interest in the West Bank and
Jerusalem and prefers to call them by their historical names: Judea and Samaria. See Blum,
The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L.
REV. 279 (1968).
123 Jordan may find it to her advantage to recognize Israel. Israel has made it clear that
it will not withdraw from the West Bank if complete control is given to the PLO. Israel's
position is that a Palestinian state already exists under the name of Jordan and any deter-
minations of boundaries pursuant to Res. 242 and 338 must occur between Israel and Jor-
dan. A. GERSON, supra note 99 at 207.
124 It is not entirely clear that King Hussein has relinquished all of his territorial claims
to the PLO even through Jordan voted in favor of the PLO representing the Palestinians at
the Arab Summit meeting at Rabat. See note 99, supra. "Jordan's statements regarding
relinquishment of title to the West Bank appear to be rhetorical, their value limited to a
display of pan-Arabic unity. By all diplomatic reports, Jordan retains a genuine interest in
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Jordan's argument would remain a three step process in establishing
its right to the West Bank except that the first step would be replaced
with a different premise. Jordan would take the position that the Pales-
tine Mandate granted mutual rights in Palestine to the Palestinians and
Jews, rather than exclusive rights to the Palestinians and contrary to the
Palestinian position, Jordan would further assert that the United Nations
General Assembly had the legal authority to implement its Partition
Plan. '25 As a result, the Palestinians acquired a sovereignty right to the
West Bank and Jerusalem that could be ceded to Jordan, except that it
acquired it through the Partition Plan, rather than through the Palestine
Mandate. Accordingly, the Palestinians no longer could have any separate
legal claim to Palestine because the territory known as Palestine would
no longer exist.'26 The Palestinians, in effect, would not be refugees from
Palestine but Jordanian citizens. 2 7 The West Bank would revert back to
the ousted legitimate sovereign, Jordan, because Israel's action in 1967
was unlawful and not an act of self defense.
128
C. The Israeli Position
Aside from Israel's historical links to Palestine, 2 9 Israeli sovereignty
regaining the West Bank." A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 207. "In a dramatic challenge to the
Camp David peace process, Jordan's King Hussein and the PLO have revived the idea of
reuniting the Israeli occupied West Bank with Jordan proper. . . .The major significance of
Hussein's forthcoming initiative is that it retreats from the often stated Arab goal of creat-
ing an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1979, at
27.
125 See sec. III(A), supra. See also sec IV(C) and IV(D) infra.
"' The only claim the Palestinians have according to this theory, is against Jordan for
usurping the Arab state which was given to them by the United Nations Partition Plan. See
sec. IV(D) infra.
127 On April 13, 1950, the Council of the Arab League concluded that any Arab nation
which was to annex Arab Palestine would be subject to sanctions by the League. On May 15,
1950, the Political Committee of the Arab League agreed that Jordan's action of annexing
Arab Palestine was in violation of the Council's resolution of April 13, 1950. 2 M. WHITE-
MAN, supra note 27, at 1166-67. The other Arab states criticized Jordan because the union
with Arab Palestine, in effect, recognized the United Nations Partition Plan. Comment, The
Arab-Israeli War and International Law, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 232, 238 (1968). But see, A.
GERSON, supra note 99, at 208-09. "It would seem that . . . the views of the West Bank's
traditional leadership continue to prevail and that . . . the realpolitik of the West Bank's
position prevents any real break with Hussein and meaningful collaboration with the PLO."
Id.
128 See note 70 supra. See also King Hussein's statement to the United Nations asking
for swift condemnation of Israel as the aggressor in the 1967 war. 22 U.N. GAOR, 5th emer-
gency special session, (1536th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1536 (1967). But see Shapira,
supra note 65. "Substantial majorities of the Security Council, as well as of the General
Assembly, rejected all proposals designed to brand Israel as the aggressor and to order the
withdrawal of its forces back to the armistice demarcation lines." Id. at 79.
" See note 101 supra.
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claims stem from the Palestine Mandate.130 Israel's argument is based on
the premise that the Palestine Mandate afforded mutual rights to both
the Palestinians and the Jews. 3' Israel supports this contention with the
historical fact that the United Nations succeeded the League of Na-
tions,"s2 adopted the Partition Plan, and had the legal authority to imple-
ment it."" As a result, the State of Israel rightfully declared its
independence.3 4
Israel's argument for occupying West Jerusalem in 1948 is "[ihat the
United Nations had failed to provide a legal framework for Jerusalem and
that the action of the [Israeli] Provisional Government was designed to
fill this gap for the portion under Jewish control. 13 5 Although Israel has
justified its occupation of West Jerusalem, Israel has never officially ex-
plained its sovereignty claim in terms of international law because Israeli
sovereignty over West Jerusalem is rarely challenged."' Some have sug-
gested that Israel might argue that West Jerusalem was open to occupa-
tion,1 7 because the Arab Palestinians rejected the Partition Plan in 1948.
Because "[s]overeignty over a mandated territory is in abeyance,",," it
remains suspended until a state can acquire it through legal means. As a
result, Israel acquired West Jerusalem in 1948 while acting in self defense
130 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
"'1 It is relevant to note Britain's policy in Palestine in light of the Palestine Mandate,
the legal instrument that set forth the rights of the parties concerned: "When it is asked
what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be
answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Pales-
tine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community. . . . But in
order that this community should have the best prospect of free development . . . it is
essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not sufferance." Re-
printed in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34 at 33 (emphasis added). See sec. IV(B) infra.
"2 See sec. IV(B) infra. But see note 111 supra and accompanying text.
See note 111 supra.
.134 E. Lauterpacht argues that Israel did not rely upon the Partition Plan as a legal
basis for the creation of the State of Israel but mentioned it only as a relevant historic
element. Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 943. See, The Declaration of the Establishment of
Israel, reprinted in, III DocumENrrs: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 348 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
Although Israel may not have relied upon the partition plan as a legal basis, sovereignty
could not vest in Israel but for the partition plan. See sec. IV(D) infra.
,35 H. Bovis, supra note 37, at 63.
'3" Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 961.
,37 Lauterpacht argues that the Partition Plan did not have any legal effect with re-
spect to the Arab state because they rejected it. The land was, therefore, open to be occu-
pied by Israel if it could acquire it through legal means because sovereignty was suspended.
He applies his theory to the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well. Lauterpacht, supra
note 29, at 960-73. But see Cattan, Sovereignty Over Jerusalem, supra note 43, at 219.
"Such an attitude is tantamount to a denial by Israel of its birth certificate." Id. See sec.
IV(D) infra. (supporting a different theory).
18 International Status of South West Africa Case, [1950] I.C.J. 128, 150 (Lord Arnold
McNair, separate opinion). See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
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to Jordan's invasion."s9 Accordingly, Israel could annex it because Israel
acquired it through legal means. 4 °
Israel's position regarding the nature of its presence in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem since 1967, can be best explained by looking at
the administration of both territories. Israel has administered East Jeru-
salem and the West Bank differently.14 1
On June 27, 1967, the Israeli Parliament passed the Law and Admin-
istration Ordinance Law, which provided that "the law, jurisdiction and
administration of the state shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel desig-
nated by the Government by order.' 4 2 The following day, the Parliament
declared new boundaries for the city of Jerusalem.14 3 Israel although
never formally annexing" East Jerusalem, has incorporated it within its
civil jurisdiction. 45
With respect to the West Bank, however, Israel has only claimed the
rights of a belligerent occupant. 46 Jordanian law has remained in force 47
subject only to the security needs of Israel, as belligerent occupant." 8
"IS See note 65 supra. It is possible that Israel could argue a strategic claim which is
based on the necessity of acquiring territory in order to establish an effective self-defense
system for existing sovereign territory. See N. HILL, supra note 27 at 65. Cf. Lauterpacht,
supra note 29, at 969.
140 See note 138 supra.
14 See Gerson supra note 70 at 10-14.
142 Law of June 7, 1967 [5727-1967] Knesset no. 24 (Israel), 21 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 75.
143 Id.
14 But see Gerson, supra note 70, at 11. See, Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 973-75.
141 "Extension of full civilian government to occupied territory is in fact, annexation."
Gerson, supra, note 70 at 12 & n.33; The United Nations General Assembly has called upon
Israel "to rescind all measures already taken and desist from taking any action which will
alter the status of Jerusalem." G.A. RES. 2254, 22 U.N. GAOR. (5th emergency Special
Sess.) Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967). See U.N. Docs. S/Res/252 (1968), S/Res/267
(1969), S/Res/271 (1969). Israel's reaction was that it did not take any action to alter the
status of Jerusalem. Its position was that "the measures adopted related to the integration
of Jerusalem in the administrative spheres, and furnish a legal basis for the protection of
the Holy Places in Jerusualem." U.N. Docs. A/6753; S/8052 (1967). See Stone, No Peace-
No War in the Middle East, in II ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 141, 148-149 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
"[I]f the Secretary-General's Representative was right in September to think that the sub-
stantial purpose of these measures was to upgrade the services for the Old City's inhabitants
to equal those for West Jerusalem's inhabitants, then the effect of rescission would be to
downgrade them back to inequality, Or, . . . the resolutions would be suggesting that it is
unlawful for an occupying authority to treat the local inhabitants more favorably than at a
minimum standard set by international law." Id.
46 Gerson supra note 70 at 12. See sec. IV(E) infra.
147 Israel Defense Forces Proclamation No. 2, I PROCLAMATIONS, ORDERS & APPOINT-
MENTS 1 (1967). "[T]he law which existed in the region as of June 7, 1967, shall remain in
force insofar as it is not repugnant to this Proclamation or to any proclamation or order
which will be issued by [the military commander] or to the changes resulting from the es-
tablishment of the rule of the Israel Defence Forces in the Region." Id.
145 See Blum, supra note 122 at 295-97.
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Yet, although Israel claims the rights of a belligerent occupant and re-
tains Jordanian Law in the area, Israel does not necessarily acknowledge
that Jordan is the legitimate sovereign in the West Bank.149 An Israeli
recognition of the legitimate sovereign of the West Bank is not required
to support Israel's claim of belligerent occupancy, as long as it continues
to recognize that some ousted legitimate sovereign possesses reversionary
rights in the occupied area. 50 Israel's policy as to the proper sovereign in
the West Bank will depend on political motivation and its changing rela-
tionship with the Palestinians and the Kingdom of Jordan. 15 '
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPETING CLAIMS TO DETERMINE THE
LEGAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM.
To determine the legal status of Jerusalem, as assessment of the
competing claims must address the following: First, the vesting of sover-
eignity following Turkish rule; second, the Palestine Mandate and Pales-
tinian self-determination; third, U.N. competency to review the Palestine
issue; fourth, Israel's and Jordan's claims to Jerusalem; fifth, Palestine's
alleged cession of rights in the West Bank to Jordan; sixth, the Jordan-
Israel Armistice Agreement; seventh, Israel's claims to sovereignty based
on the 1967 war.
A. Vesting of Sovereignty Following Turkish Rule
Turkey ceded sovereignty to Palestine to the Principal Allied and As-
sociated Powers. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, did not offi-
cially annex Palestine. They agreed to give Palestine to the League of
Nations, in order that it, as a world body, could determine the future of
Palestine.1 52 The League of Nations created its Mandate System specifi-
cally to prevent the victors of World War I from annexing the conquered
territory and thereby assure that "the well being and development" of the
inhabitants of the territory could be advanced as a "sacred trust of civili-
zation," to serve the "interest . . .of humanity in general."'15 Yet, with
the League of Nations Mandate System replacing the traditional methods
of acquisition of territory recognized in customary international law, the
40 Gerson, supra note 70, at 14.
'5' See sec. IV(D) infra. But see Blum, supra note 122. If Israel were to decide to annex
the West Bank, Israel would have to prove that it acquired sovereignty by way of prescrip-
tion or cession.
,51 Israel's legal policy in reference to the West Bank presumably will depend upon
what is best for it politically. See note 123 supra.
32 See e.g., Palestine Mandate, preamble, supra note 46 at 75.
,8 LEAGUE or NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, supra note 47 at 72. F. KHOURi, supra note
105, at 1-15. A. GERSON supra note 99, at 40-43. Bassiouni & Fisher supra note 20, at 437.
Comments, supra note 127, at 235.
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legal perceptions of the transfer of sovereignty became confused.""
Five entities have generally been recognized 55 as possible sovereignty
holders while the Mandate System existed: (1) the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers; (2) the Mandatory Power; (3) the League of Nations;
(4) the people of mandate territories; and (5) combinations of the above.
Many arguments have been cited for the benefit of one entity to the
detriment of another in an attempt to establish the proper sovereign at
that time. 56 The choices presented, however, are not satisfactory, because
they are based on a misconceived premise that the Mandate System had
to be specifically translated into the traditional modes of sovereignty. On
the contrary, the Mandate System was created primarily because the for-
mer methods of acquisition of territory could not adequately satisfy the
intentions of the League of Nations.157
The best approach to follow is that of Judge McNair, where he held
in his separate opinion in the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the International Status of South West Africa, that
"[s]overeignty over a mandated territory is in abeyance; if and when the
inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as an independent state
" See e.g., R. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES & TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS, 229-36
(1955); Comment supra note 46; Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations
Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 268-72 (1948).
185 Sayre, supra note 154; Gerson, supra note 70, at 24.
'" For an excellent discussion concerning the rationale used behind each choice see
Gerson, supra note 70, at 24-27; Comment, supra note 46 at 1205; Note, supra note 44, at
286-89. E. Lauterpacht suggests that sovereignty was divided between the League and the
Mandatory. Lauterpacht, supra note 29 at 964. See Note, supra 74, at 226 (supporting no-
tion that sovereignty was in the Mandatory Power). See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 75, at 222
n.5 (summary statement of different views).
17 "[Tihe mandate system . . . is a new institution-a new relationship between a terri-
tory and its inhabitants on the one hand and the government which represents them inter-
nationally on the other-a new species of international government, which does not fit into
the old conception of sovereignty and which is alien to it. The doctrine of sovereignty has no
application to this new system." The Advisory Opinion on International Status of South
West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128, 150 (Lord Arnold McNair, separate opinion). "Under the
provisions of Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article 65 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, the court is empowered to give an advisory opinion on
'any legal question.' The Charter provides that the request for an advisory opinion may be
made by the General Assembly, the Security Council and such other organs of the United
Nations and specialized agencies as may be authorized by the General Assembly." N. LEECH,
C. OLIVER & 0. SWEENEY, CASES & MATERIALS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 60-61
(1973).
In accordance with Article 57 of the Statute for the I.C.J., if the judgment does not
represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the Judges, and Judge shall be
entitled to deliver a separate opinion. For an excellent book on the effect of a judgment by
the International Court of Justice, see II S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 596 (1965).
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* . .sovereignty will revive and vest in the new state."158 In other words,
sovereignty is not vested in any particular entity but remains suspended
until a state can acquire it through legal means. Accordingly, because the
Mandate System forces an abeyance of sovereignty, and inevitably a sus-
pension of traditional customary international law methods of acquisition
of title, only each specific Mandate could establish the rules and regula-
tions needed to ultimately acquire sovereign rights. Therefore, only the
Palestine Mandate could, as the governing body of law over Palestine and
the culmination of the explicit intent of the League of Nations, establish
and define the scope of any legal interest in Palestine and their respective
relationships to the creation of a sovereign.1 59
The governing principle of the Palestine Mandate, as well as the en-
tire Mandate System was that "[t]he well being and development of such
people form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the per-
formance of this trust should be embodied in the Covenant."160 Although
an analogy has been made between mandates and common law trusts, 6 1
it should be clarified that such an analogy should not allow a translation
of the Mandate System into terms of trust, for such an approach shades
the true intent of the League of Nations and presumes that common law
interpretation is compatible with international actions.6 2 Nowhere in Ar-
ticle 22 of the League of Nations Covenant or in the Palestine Mandate
did the League of Nation's offer language that would suggest their intent
to divide sovereignty into legal and equitable rights. Moreover, the Man-
date System was not created to enrich the League of Nations or Britain
with any title interest in Palestine, but rather was created to benefit the
people who were allowed to reside in Palestine. 6 3
It is best to interpret the term, trust, as a reflection of the intent of
the League of Nations to establish its role, as well as the role of the
Mandatory, Great Britain, as overseer, "entrusted" with a capacity to su-
pervise and advise16 4 and to guarantee the rights established in the Pales-
tine Mandate. 6 5 With such an interpretation, Judge McNair's theory that
108 The International Status of South West Africa [1950] I.C.J. 128.
"' See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, supra note 31; Palestine Mandate, supra
note 46.
160 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, supra note 31.
161 H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-
98 (1927).
I'2 "It does not follow, however, that a state holding a territory in trusteeship is vested
with title to it because a trustee is usually vested with title to the trust at common law." N.
LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, supra note 157, at 766.
63 Id.
16 "[N]o technical significance can be attached to the words 'sacred trust of civiliza-
tion.' " International Status of South West Africa [1950] I.C.J. 128, 148 (Lord Arnold Mc-
Nair, separate opinion).
"' See note 46 supra.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. Vol. 12:169
sovereignty in Palestine remained in abeyance-can be seen as compati-
ble with the fact that the League and Britain were entrusted with the
responsibility of terminating their role as overseers when the beneficiaries
of the Mandate were "able to stand alone." ' ' 6
B. The Palestinian Mandate and Palestinian Self-Determination6 7
The Palestine Mandate did not deny the Palestinians their right to
self-determination for the following reasons. First, it is generally accepted
that after World War I, when the Mandate System was initiated, and
until the United Nations was created, the idea of self-determination was
only a political principle and not a legal one recognized in international
law."'68 Second, any attempt to try to apply retroactively the contempo-
rary legal principle of self-determination to the situation in Palestine af-
ter World War I, is to deny the fact that the Palestine Mandate was sui
generis.6 9 Third, the Permanent Court of International Justice implicitly
ruled in favor of the validity of the Palestine Mandate.7 0 The ultimate
16 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 31, at art. 22, para. 4.
'e See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
'6 See Feinberg, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, supra note 32, at
423-34; J. STONE, SELF DETERMINATION AND THE PALESTINIAN ARABS (1970); D. NINCIc, THE
PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 219-59
(1970). E. Lauterpacht argues that the Arabs were not denied their right of self-determina-
tion. He cites Togoland and the Cameroons as examples of single territories that have been
divided on the basis of self-determination, and contends, that the principle of self-determi-
nation need not only apply to a single territorial unit. The Jews were not to decide for the
Arabs, nor were the Arabs to decide for the Jews. "[Tihe decision of the United Nations to
recommend the partition of Palestine, far from being a denial of the right of self-determina-
tion, was in fact, a direct application of the principle." Lauterpacht, supra note 29 at 942;
See League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs on the Aaland Islands,
April 16, 1921, L.N. Doc. B.7 21/68/106. (This was the only formal report on self-determina-
tion before World War II). "Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an
important part in modern political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be
pointed out that there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The
recognition of this principle in a certain number of international treaties cannot be consid-
ered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Na-
tions .. " Id. But see, Bassiouni & Fisher supra note 20, at 448-52. According to Julius
Stone, Professor of International Law at the University of Sydney, "[t]he Palestinian Arabs
were merely a peripheral rather than a distinctive segment whose interests as such were
taken into account. Consequently, to present a Palestinian 'entity,' and people presumably
emergent in the 1960's ... is an unwarranted and dubious game with history." Stone, Peace
and the Palestinians, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 247, 250 (1970). Cf. "The acceptance of
self-determination as a legal principle by the various instruments of the United Nations
Charter... would.., have no bearing on the validity of the rights of the parties as they
existed under the Palestine Mandate." Gerson, supra note 70, at 28, n.88.
169 Id. at 27, n.23. Cf. note 131 supra.
170 The Mavromattis Concession, [1925] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 2, No. 5; The Mavromattis
Concession [1927] P.C.I.J., ser A. No. 11.
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effect of that ruling, therefore, was to recognize that mutual rights were
established by the Palestine Mandate acknowledging that the Palestini-
ans could not have the exclusive right of self-determination in all of Pal-
estine. Fourth, the fact the the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
did not automatically cede Palestine to the Palestinians, but instead, sup-
ported the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into the Palestinian
Mandate, and accepted the entire Mandate System, suggests that the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers would have annexed Palestine for
themselves, if the intent of the League of Nations had been to grant ex-
clusive sovereignty rights to the Palestinians.'
7 1
The Palestine Mandate was sui generis among Mandated territories
because it afforded special rights to a minority people to establish a
homeland in Palestine. 172 These rights were specifically articulated and
incorporated in the Preamble and Articles 2, 4, 6, and 22 of the Palestine
Mandate. Article 2, for example, required the Mandatory to "secure the
establishment of the Jewish National Home,' ' "7 in Palestine while Article
22 made Hebrew as well as Arabic and English, an official language of the
mandated territory. 7 4 Although the Mandate granted Jews rights in Pal-
estine which could not be interfered with by the Palestinians, it did not,
however, grant the Jews exclusive right to the territory of Palestine. In
fact, the Mandate also provided "that nothing should be done which
might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com-
munities in Palestine." 1 5 Thus, the Palestinians as well as the Jews were
the beneficiary people of the Palestine Mandate. Each had the opportu-
nity to acquire sovereignty rights in Palestine. Sovereignty, however,
would remain in abeyance until either the Palestinians or the Jews or
both were able to demonstrate a self-government that would be accept-
able to the League of Nations and the Mandatory as a prelude to a viable
state.17 6
Unfortunately, "[n]either Arab nor Jew ha[d] any sense of service to
a single state.' 77 The continuing Arab demand for exclusive rule in Pal-
estine denied any Jewish interest in a national homeland while the Jewish
demand refused to acknowledge exclusive Palestinian rule. As a result,
the idea of a bi-national state in Palestine deteriorated quickly as vio-
lence and terrorism -amongst the Arabs and the Jews replaced verbal
threats. Although Great Britain recognized as early as 1937, the impracti-
171 See generally sec. III supra; Palestine Mandate, Preamble, supra note 46, at 75.
172 Gerson, supra note 70, at 27. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 92.
173 Palestine Mandate, supra note 46, at 76.
1' Id. at 81-82.
'7 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
176 See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
177 W. LAQUER, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 57 (1970).
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calities of a bi-national state in Palestine, Britain rejected a partition
plan proposal from the Royal Commission"' s and opted instead to reaf-
firm its controlling power in Palestine. It was not until 1947, that Great
Britain realized that it should no longer control the escalating violence
between the Arabs and the Jews. That realization, coupled with interna-
tional protest against British restrictive Jewish immigration policies in
light of the Nazi Holocaust, forced Britain to renounce its role as
Mandatory and submit the Palestine issue to the United Nations. 17 9
C. The Competency of the United Nations to Review the Palestine
Issue
When Britain submitted the question of Palestine to the General As-
sembly, and the Assembly passed its Palestine Partition Resolution, 8 '
the Palestinians immediately rejected the binding effect of that resolu-
tion. They argued that (1) the Resolution denied them their right to self-
determination; (2) the resolution was contrary to the requirements of the
Palestine Mandate and (3) the Resolution exceeded the power granted to
the Assembly by the Charter of the United Nations.' The Jewish posi-
tion, however, was that "[o]nly the United Nations is competent to deter-
mine the future of the territory, and its decisions, therefore, ha[d] a bind-
ing force.' 8 2 The Palestinian arguments on self-determination and
breach of Mandate must fail for the same reasons they failed when the
'78 The Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission proposed that Britain be granted a perma-
nent mandate over Jerusalem and that the rest of Palestine be partitioned. See Report of
the Palestine Royal Commission, COMMAND PAPERS, 5479 (1937) reprinted in III Docu-
MENTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 150 (J. Moore ed. 1974) (excerpts).
The following year, the Woodhead Commission, set up by England to review the possi-
bility of partition of Palestine, rejected a Jewish proposal which endorsed partition but sug-
gested that the new city of Jerusalem and Mount Scopus be included in the Jewish State.
By 1939, Great Britain was disillusioned with the idea of partition and announced in the
McDonald White Paper its intention to establish an Arab majority in an independent Pales-
tinian State with Jerusalem as its capital. The League of Nations rejected the proposal be-
cause it violated the obligation of the Mandate. See The British White Paper of May 17,
1939, COMMAND PAPERS 6019 (1939), reprinted in III DOCUMENTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CON-
FLICT (J. Moore ed. 1974).
The Morrison Grady Plan of 1946, was a proposal that Palestine be transformed into a
cantonal state consisting of two autonomous Jewish and Arab Provinces, and two areas, one
of which included Jerusalem, to be controlled by a central government. The Jews and the
Arabs rejected the plan and the United Nations refused to recognize it. Morrison Plan,
COMMAND PAPERS 7044 (1946).
179 A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 47.
G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947). Reprinted
in III DOCUMENTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 313 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
181 See H. CATTAN, supra note 46, at 74-107.
182 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 127 (1947).
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Mandate System was originally initiated. The Mandate did not establish
exclusive Palestinian rights in Palestine; it established mutual rights for
the Palestinians and the Jews. The Mandate never explicitly required
that those mutual interests coexist to form one sovereign state. Both in-
terests in Palestine were contingent upon an ability to demonstrate state-
hood and subject to the approval of the League of Nations and Britain.
Without that approval, sovereignty could not vest in either party. Al-
though a bi-national state in Palestine was an impractical expectation, as
a result of adverse claims to the territory, the opportunity for each people
to acquire sovereignty rights in parts of Palestine, remained a practical
approach in administering the Mandate.183 The U.N. Partition Plan did
not conflict with the requirements of the Palestine Mandate, nor did it
create new legal rights to the detriment of old ones.' On the contrary,
the United Nations Partition Plan was the only practical way available to
administer the Mandate without violating the specificity of the Mandate's
terms. 8 5
The United Nations' competency to review the situation in Palestine
was confirmed retroactively in the case of the International Status of
South West Africa, an advisory opinion by the International Court of
Justice, 8 1 which expressed the view that the status of a mandated terri-
tory could be altered only with the consent of the United Nations. More-
over, the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case 8 7 recognized
that the United Nations General Assembly could make legally binding
decisions which went beyond its normal recommendatory role when it ac-
ted as a substitute for the defunct League of Nations.
[T]o deny to a political organ of the United Nations which is a successor
to the League in this respect, the right to act, on the argument that it
lacks competence to render what is described as a judicial decision would
not only be inconsistent but would amount to a complete denial of reme-
dies available against fundamental breaches of an international tak-
ing .... (I)t would not be correct to assume that, because the General
Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debar-
183 See The Palestine Mandate, supra note 46 at 74. Feinberg, The Arab Israeli Con-
flict in International Law, supra note 32, at 448-50.
184 But see, J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 131-35
(1969).
I"' This is so because both the Palestinians and the Jews eagerly wanted their own
state and undoubtedly would not accept a United Nations Trusteeship. Because the Pales-
tine Mandate granted mutual rights, the only sensible alternative for the United Nations
was to separate Palestine and give both beneficiaries a state.
,s' The International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128.
181 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)
[1971] I.C.J. 16.
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red from adopting, in specific. cases within the framework of its compe-
tence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative
design. 8
No international organization at that time, was better suited than the
United Nations to determine the future government of Palestine and to
preserve the mutual rights of the people within it. Great Britain as
Mandatory could not unilaterally terminate the Mandate, or decide the
political future of Palestine, without approval of the League of Nations. 89
Since Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter corresponds to the prin-
ciples embodied in Article 22 of the League's Covenant, 190 the logical re-
placement for the League of Nations when it became a defunct organiza-
tion, was the United Nations.'
The United Nations, however, was limited in interpreting its role and
its relationship with Palestine and its Mandate, to the terms of its Char-
ter. Pursuant to Article 80, it could not impose a trusteeship over a Man-
dated territory if it were "to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of
any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international agree-
ments. ... "I Accordingly, the United Nations could not acquire rights
in Palestine that did not belong to the League of Nations, nor could it
usurp the rights from the beneficiaries of the Mandate.' Moreover, it
could not acquire sovereignty in any part of Palestine. Sovereignty re-
mained in abeyance until the Mandate was terminated and a state would
acquire it through legal means. It could only act within the scope of the
Palestine Mandate and assume the responsibilities of the League of Na-
tions. It had three choices that would not be repugnant to the Mandate:
"' Id. at 49-50.
199 Article 27 of the Palestine Mandate provides as follows: "The consent of the Council
of the League of Nations is required for any modifications of the terms of this Mandate."
The Palestine Mandate, supra note 46 at 82.
0 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
"I According to H. Kelsen, "The United Nations did not succeed to the rights of the
League of Nations as to the former mandated territories." H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, 596 (1951). But see Gerson supra note 70 at 35. "The United Nations was
• ..the most competent international body to determine the future of the Mandate on its
termination ... " Id. See also Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West
Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128, 130; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Res. 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 9 (affirming principle that the United Nations succeeded the League).
According to Eugene Rostow, Yale Law Professor and former Under Secretary of State, "the
mandate is a continuing trust of international character, like the mandate for German South
West Africa, now called Namibia. The continued vitality of the Palestine Mandate as a trust
is confirmed by U.N. CHARTER, art. 80 and the most recent advisory opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in Namibia Case." G. Will, The Real Obstacles to Peace, NEWSWEEK,
92 (1978).
192 U.N. CHARTER, art. 80.
'93 "The assembly could not by its resolution give the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine
any rights which either did not otherwise possess: nor, correspondingly, could it take away
such rights as they did possess." Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 940.
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(1) terminate the Mandate and place the Mandated territory within the
framework of its Trusteeship System; (2) terminate the Mandate and al-
low sovereignty rights to vest in the Palestinians and Jews in separate
states; (3) establish a proposal that combined the best of both choices. Its
decision was to endorse a partition plan and a trusteeship over
Jerusalem.1
9 4
The United Nations Partition Plan was not only legally correct, but
politically sound.195 It provided for an equitable reconciliation between
adverse parties with mutual rights, by allowing each to establish self-gov-
ernment and obtain sovereign control over respective areas. Its decision
to make Jerusalem a corpus separatum was also legitimate.19 6 The propo-
sal to internationalize Jerusalem did not violate the requirements of the
Palestine Mandate. Although Article 5 of the Mandate prohibited any
Palestinian territory from being "ceded or leased. . . or in any other way
placed under the control of the Government of any foreign power,"',9 it
did not prohibit "the Mandatory from entering into. . . arrangements as
he may deem reasonable . . . with the Administration [of Palestine]" to
guarantee and protect the Holy Places and religious buildings in Pales-
tine.' The United Nations' special objective in internationalizing Jerusa-
lem was "to protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious
interests located in the city. . .[and] to foster cooperation among all the
inhabitants of the city . . . . "'19 Accordingly, its objective was the same
as that of the League of Nations. Its solution, however, was different. As
long as the United Nations did not usurp from the Palestinians and Jews
their potential sovereignty interests in Jerusalem200 as a part of Palestine,
'9, G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
"' See 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 68-75 (1966). But see CATTAN, supra note 46, at 42:
"Neither the Palestinians nor the Arab states have accepted the resolution for the partition
of Palestine. They consider it to be invalid and of no effect. Their attitude is based upon
political, historical and judicial considerations." See note 137 supra.
'9' Concerning the special status of Jerusalem, see, Lauterpacht supra note 29; Jones,
The Status of Jerusalem: Some National and International Aspects, 33 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 169 (1968); Y. BLUM, supra note 62; Pfaff, Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli
Settlement, in I THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1010 (J. Moore ed. 1974); Wilson, The Interna-
tionalization of Jerusalem, 23 MIDDLE EAST J. 1 (1969); The Question of Jerusalem, The
Wall St. J. Sept. 13, 1979, at 22, col. 4.
"' The Palestine Mandate, art. 5, supra note 46, at 76.
,98 Id. art. 13, at 78.
99 G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 131, U.N. Doc. A/519, Part III, C.1(a)
(1947).
200 According to the terms of the United Nations Partition Plan, the Trusteeship Coun-
cil was required to reexamine the trusteeship over Jerusalem after a ten year period. "The
residents of the city shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as
to possible modifications of the regime of the city." Id. at Part III, D. See note 59, supra.
Accordingly, the Palestinians and the Jews had contingency rights to acquiring sovereignty
in Jerusalem.
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the United Nations could experiment with the solution of international-
izing Jerusalem. By attempting to incorporate Jerusalem within its Trus-
teeship System, it could theoretically extend the length of the Mandate
and prevent sovereignty from vesting until a future date.
D. A Binding Partition Plan
The United Nations Resolution of Partition was legally binding upon
all of the parties, even though Israel was the only state to declare its inde-
pendence after the Partition Plan was approved. 0 1 As a result, sover-
eignty rights vested in the Palestinian people in the West Bank, while
sovereignty rights vested in the Jews of Israel. Sovereignty in Jerusalem,
however, did not vest in either party because it remained in abeyance as a
result of the United Nations' intended Trusteeship. Although the Pales-
tinians refused to accept the Partition Plan, they were rejecting it be-
cause of its limiting effect; not because they were denying their sover-
eignty in the West Bank. Moreover, the United Nations imposed its
solution on Palestine; Palestinian acceptance was .not necessary require-
ment for its binding effect.2 0 2 In reference to Jerusalem as a corpus sepa-
ratum, however, the United Nations could not impose the Plan's binding
effect on the people of Palestine; the requirements of the Trusteeship
System implicitly prevented it. Its plan for internationalizing Jerusalem
had to be accepted by the "interested" parties, as well as by the
Mandatory pursuant to Article 79 of the Trusteeship System. 203 As a re-
sult of the Palestinian refusal to accept the plan to internationalize Jeru-
salem, Jerusalem could not be immediately held under trusteeship. More-
over, because Jordan and Israel occupied Jerusalem in 1948, the United
201 Gerson, supra note 70, at 35: "The United Nations resolution must... be termed
sui generis and... legally binding upon the parties."
202 Pursuant to the Palestine Mandate, the League of Nations could define and inter-
pret the terms of the Mandate. The inhabitants had the right to petition a League of Na-
tion's decision but their consent was not needed as long as the League acted within the
confines of the Mandate. As substitute for the League, the United Nations arguably did not
need any permission from the inhabitants to partition Palestine. They could impose their
decision because the Partition Plan was within the confines of the Palestine Mandate. See
supra note 46 at 74.
20 Article 79 provides as follows: "The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be
placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be
agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of
territories under mandate by a member of the United Nations and shall be approved as
provided for in Articles 83 & 85." U.N. CHARTER, art. 79. In The International Status of
South West Africa [1950] I.C.J. 128,134 the I.C.J. stated that Article 80 "presupposes that
the rights of states and peoples shall not lapse automatically on the dissolution of the
League of Nations. It obviously was the intention to safeguard the rights of States and peo-
ples under all circumstances and in all respects." Id.
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Nations plan was effectively frustrated at the time. Yet, the United Na-
tions prevented either the Jewish or Palestinian State from being vested
with title in Jerusalem when it demonstrated its intent to put the city
under a trusteeship and to postpone any Jewish or Palestinian sover-
eignty interest in Jerusalem for at least ten years.20' Although Jerusalem
was not technically under trusteeship, sovereignty could not vest in any
party until the United Nations demonstrated its lack of intent to intern-
tionalize the city.
Loss of title or acquisition of title to other territory in either the Jew-
ish State or the Palestinian State could only be accomplished by the
traditional methods of acquisition of territory recognized in customary in-
ternational law-prescription, cession or conquest.20 5 Title to Jerusalem,
however, would remain in abeyance until the United Nations abandoned
its intent to internationalize Jerusalem, allowing a recognized state to ac-
quire sovereignty through legitimate means. 208
E. Israeli and Jordanian Claims to Jerusalem Based on Post-1948
Occupation
Neither Israel nor Jordan was able to acquire sovereignty to Jerusa-
lem in 1948. Jerusalem was not a res nullius20 7 vulnerable to being
claimed by the first taker. Although the United Nations was unable to
implement its plan to internationalize Jerusalem in 1948, it did not
demonstrate any relinquishment of its intent to make Jerusalem a corpus
separatum. As a result, sovereignty remained in abeyance. 20 8
Israel did have the right, however, to occupy West Jerusalem in order
to protect its newly established state and the existing Jewish communi-
ties in Jerusalem.20 9 Although it could not annex West Jerusalem, it was a
lawful occupant, nevertheless, because its occupation was in response to
an attack by another state.210 It could not be called a belligerent occu-
pant, however, because an ousted sovereign did not exist.21 1 Arguably,
204 See note 200 supra.
205 See sec. III supra.
210 Only the League of Nations and the Mandatory would determine when their control
over the inhabitants of Palestine would end. See note 166 supra. As substitute for the
League, the United Nations would be vested with the same power as the League to deter-
mine when the Mandate was over.
207 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
208 See note 158 supra.
210 According to Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 969: "The Arabs attacking the Jews
outside the area of the Jewish state and by forcibly rejecting the internationalization of
Jerusalem were themselves responsible for the first Israeli expansion beyond the Partition
boundaries." Note a possible strategic claim by Israel, supra note 139.
2o See note 139 supra.
21 A presupposition of the belligerent occupant is that the ousted sovereign has a re-
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Israel could remain in Jerusalem in order to protect it and its future con-
tingent interest in the city, until the United Nations was able to imple-
ment its plan, or was able to demonstrate that it had no interest in en-
forcing its plan at all.
Jordan, however, did not have the right even to occupy East Jerusa-
lem. Its actions were considered unlawful by the majority of the world
because Jordanian military intervention in Palestine in 1948 was a viola-
tion of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter which stipulates that
"all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. '212 Jordan was an aggressor occupant. 213 Its actions were not
only declared illegal by the majority of nations but also violently opposed
by the other Arab states.
21 4
F. Jordanian Claims to the West Bank
Although Jordan illegally entered Palestine in 1948, nothing pre-
vented Jordan from obtaining its sovereignty from the Palestinians, if the
Palestinians decided to cede their sovereignty rights. The Partition
Plan vested sovereignty in the Palestinians and the Jews in their respec-
tive states. Consequently, each could lose sovereignty over territory by
prescription and cession-the traditional methods of acquisition of terri-
tory recognized in international law. The Palestinians and Jews, however,
could transfer only that territory over which they had exclusive sover-
eignty. The Palestinians did not have sovereignty in East Jerusalem, be-
cause as a result of the United Nations' intent to internationalize the city
sovereignty remained in abeyance. Although the Palestinians could trans-
fer their sovereignty rights in the West Bank, they could not transfer any
part of Jerusalem to Jordan.215
versionary interest. In this case, an ousted sovereign did not exist; sovereignty was in abey-
ance. Cf. Blum, supra note 122, at 294.
212 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
I" Gerson supra note 70 at 7. See F. SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE LAW OF
PEACE AND WAR 224 (1966). "It can be no longer maintained that the laws of war apply
equally in all respects to the aggressors and the defenders. Basically the aggressor should
not derive from his illegal act any rights under the customary rules of war." Id. But see H.
KELSEN, supra note 191, at 215-16. "[S]tates are obliged to respect the territorial integrity of
other states; but a violation of this obligation does not exclude the change of the legal situa-
tion. The principle advocated by some writers-ex injuria jus non oritur. . . - does not,
or not without important exceptions, apply in international law." Id. See also J. BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 172-73 (1963). "The truth is that international law can no more refuse
to recognize that a finally successful conquest does change the title to territory than munici-
pal law can a change of regime brought about by a successful revolution." Id.
214 See note 127 supra.
215 The West Bank, is under the control of the Israeli Government. Discussion of the
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In 1949, Israel and Jordan signed an armistice agreement,21 6 freezing
all legal claims to Jerusalem. Neither Israel nor Jordan could make any
legal moves to acquire either East Jerusalem or West Jerusalem as long as
the armistice remained in effect. Moreover, no party could acquire any
type of sovereignty rights in Jerusalem as long as the United Nations had
the intent to make it a corpus separatum.
Positions of occupation and sovereignty were established at the end
of 1948. Israel had sovereignty in Israel proper.2 17 It did not have sover-
eignty in West Jerusalem, but was a lawful occupant. The Palestinians
had sovereignty in the West Bank proper. Whether they ceded their sov-
ereignty to Jordan remains an open question. The Palestinians could not,
however, transfer title to Jerusalem to the Jordanians, because the Pales-
tinians never had sovereignty in Jerusalem in the first place. As long as
the United Nations intended to make Jerusalem an international city,
sovereignty remained in abeyance. Jordan, was an aggressor occupant. It
could not annex East Jerusalem or legally occupy it. Furthermore, the
1949 Armistice Agreement froze all claims to Jerusalem. Jordan's position
in the West Bank, however, would depend on whether the Palestinians
ceded their sovereignty rights to it.
G. United Nations Inaction
From 1948 to 1949, the United Nations made a convincing effort to
try to implement a corpus separatum in Jerusalem. Its Trusteeship
Council 218 began to prepare a Jerusalem statute.1 9 Its Palestine Concilia-
West Bank and the proposal to implement an independent Palestinian State constitutes a
major issue and is beyond the scope of this study. See sec. IV(F) supra.
210 General Armistice Agreement Apr. 3, 1949, Israel-Jordan, 42 U.N.T.S. 303-20 (1949).
217 Israel proper is that land distributed to it pursuant to the United Nations Partition
Plan.
21' In order to facilitate the Trusteeship Council, the Council President, Roger Garreau,
developed a preliminary proposal to submit to the Council at its next regular session. Gar-
reau proposed that Jerusalem be divided into three zones: an Israeli zone, a Jordanian zone
and an international zone. The Arab League called for full territorial internationalization,
and Jordan opposed any form of internationalization. Israel rejected territorial internation-
alization but was willing to discuss functional internationalization of the Holy Places. The
United Nations Trusteeship Council rejected the President's proposal.
In 1950, the Trusteeship Council invited representatives from Jordan and Israel to ap-
pear before the Committee and express their views on the draft Jerusalem statute. The
Jordanian representative repeated his government's position that it would never recognize
any international force in Jerusalem. Abba Eban, the Israeli representative, argued that the
Council should not support the establishment of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum and
stressed Jerusalem's close ties with Israel and with Jewish interests in general. Instead,
Eban endorsed a plan for functional internationalization which in effect, would create inter-
national supervision over the Holy Places. The Trusteeship Council rejected Eban's sugges-
tion and in turn approved a statute to provide for the government of Jerusalem as a corpus
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tion Commission2 2 1 continued to negotiate with the Israel and Arab Gov-
ernments trying to acquire general acceptance of the idea of an interna-
tional regime in Jerusalem. In 1949, the Assembly even adopted
Resolution 303/IV221 in which it restated its intention of international-
izing Jerusalem. The Assembly strongly favored an international city.
By 1950, however, a gradual exhaustion of a United Nations interest
in internationalizing Jerusalem began to take place. Members of the Gen-
eral Assembly were beginning to doubt the viability of the Jerusalem
plan. The Swedish and Netherland representatives introduced a proposal
in which Jerusalem would remain divided between Jordan and Israel and
that only the Holy Places would be internationalized, with the United
Nations Commissioner as supervisor.222
The Arab and Jewish Staters continued to denounce any attempt to
internationalize Jerusalem.22 Both states reiterated that an international
Jerusalem would not be acceptable to them. The Armistice Agreement
between Jordan and Israel reflected the fact that the parties involved had
separatum. With Jordan and Israel opposing the Jerusalem statute, the Trusteeship Council
refused to act until it received instructions from the General Assembly; those instructions
never came. H. Bovis, supra note 37, at 76-91.
219 The statute for Jerusalem had 43 articles defining the scope of the statute and de-
lineating the powers of the United Nations governor and the legislative council. Included
within were provisions defining citizenship, the judicial system, access to and immigration
into the city, official language and the budget for the city. See U.N. TCOR, Annex 4-24,
U.N. Doc. T/118/Rev. 2 (1948). Reprinted in III ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLIcT 423 (J. Moore ed.
1974) (Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem, prepared by the Trusteeship Council, April
21, 1948).
220 On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly established the Palestine Conciliation
Commission and suggested to it that Jerusalem have a permanent international regime. In
1949, the Commission suggested in its plan that Jerusalem be internationalized but that
Israel and Jordan remain in control in their respective territories seized in 1948. The plan
called for a United Nations Commission to coordinate and plan the entire city with the holy
places under its jurisdiction. A fourteen-member council was to be established and the
United Nations Commissioner was to appoint four of its members. See The Third Progress
Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, June 21, 1949, includ-
ing Annex A, the Lausanne Protocol of May 12, 1949, 4 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Political Com-
mittee Mtg., 2 Annexes 5-9, U.N. Doc. A/927 (1949). See also The First and Second Pro-
gress Reports of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 4 U.N. GAOR,
Ad Hoc Political Committee mtg., 2 Annexes 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/819 (1949) First Report; U.N.
Doc. A/838 (1949) Second Report.
221 [1948-49] Y.B.U.N. 196.
" Sweden: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.63 (December 5, 1950). In essence
this plan was calling for functional internationalization of the city or rather internationaliza-
tion limited to the holy places in Jerusalem. Israel was willing to accept the plan, but the
Arab League demanded full territorial internationalization of the city. Jordan, however, was
opposed to any kind of internationalization for its section of the city. H. Bows, supra note
37, at 76-80.
22 Id. at 84-85.
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no intention of leaving the city. In January, 1952 the Assembly adopted a
Resolution that recognized the failure of the Palestine Conciliation Com-
mission to acquire acceptance of the United Nations' plan, and called
upon the governments concerned to reach a settlement of their* outstand-
ing differences over Jerusalem.2 ' Although the United Nations did not
explicitly abandon the idea of internationalization, neither did it explic-
itly mention its intention to carry out its objective to make Jerusalem an
international city. From 1952 to 1967, the United Nations made it appar-
ent that it no longer had the intent to make Jerusalem a corpus separa-
turn.225 It demonstrated its lack of interest by not discussing its plan for
Jerusalem for a period of fifteen years.2 2 This inaction ripened into a new
attitude-U.N. acceptance of the historical fact that Jordan occupied
East Jerusalem and that Israel occupied West Jerusalem.
H. The Legal Status of Jerusalem
As a result of the United Nations' abandonment of its plans to inter-
nationalize Jerusalem, Jerusalem became open territory. Sovereignty
would vest in the first state able to effect occupation. It was not, however,
a res nullious, open to all occupants. An alternative term is needed to
better reflect its status. Because no such term exists in international law
and because its status is similar to that of a res nullius, Jerusalem will be
described as a "limited res nullius." The city was open to be occupied
only by those states that had a contingent interest in Jerusalem. That
contingent interest must be defined as a recognized right to be in a posi-
tion to acquire sovereignty. That position could only be filled by Israel
and the Palestinians represented by the Jordanian state.2 27 This is so be-
cause Jerusalem was part of the Palestine Mandate. The Mandate System
was designed to protect the beneficiaries of the Mandate, and the benefi-
ciaries of the Mandate were the Palestinians and Jews. Each had a con-
24 G.A. Res. 512(VI), [1951-52] Y.B.U:N. 308.
2 Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 957.
226 Id.
2 Even if the Palestinians did not cede their sovereignty rights to Jordan, Jordan
would still be their representative. Jordan effectively quashed any Palestinian growth or
political development. Jordan's ruling Hashemite elite arrested Palestinian nationalists and
suppressed Palestinianism. Although it held itself out to the world as the protector of Pales-
tinian interests, its policy was to contain the Palestinians, in order to keep control over all
of the territory. Accordingly, it is best to assume that Jordan was the Palestinian represen-
tative, in order that the Palestinian contingency interest in Jerusalem was equally capable
of vesting into a sovereignty right. If Jordan would have occupied Jerusalem in 1967, argua-
bly, the right to sovereignty would belong to the Palestinians. It would be their obligation,
however, to take it away from Jordan in order to prevent other methods of acquisition of
territory from becoming operative. Moreover, both Israel and the United Nations considered
Jordan the legal representative of any Arab interest in the West Bank or Jerusalem.
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tingent interest in Palestine that could have eventually resulted in a sov-
ereign right. As a substitute for the League of Nations, the United
Nations allowed those contingent interests to evolve into sovereign rights
by creating two states pursuant to its Partition Plan. The United Nations
terminated the Palestine Mandate only in respect to the area of Palestine
that became Israel and the Arab state. Its intent was to extend the Pales-
tine Mandate over Jerusalem, and it attempted to do so by placing Jeru-
salem under a new Mandate of Trusteeship. As a result, the Palestinians
and Jews still retained contingent rights in Jerusalem. Although the
United Nations was unable to effectuate the trusteeship, its future intent
to establish Jerusalem as an international city was enough to prevent a
suspended sovereignty from vesting in either the Arab or Jewish State.
When it abandoned that intent in 1952, there was no further encum-
brance on the vesting of sovereignty over Jerusalem. The United Nations,
in effect, left it to the two states to determine the future sovereign of
Jerusalem.
The Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel effectively pre-
vented any vesting of sovereignty rights. Neither Israel nor Jordan could
make any legal moves to acquire sovereignty in either East or West Jeru-
salem as long as the armistice was in effect. The Armistice Agreement
lasted for seventeen years, until 1967, when war broke out between Israel
and Jordan. Jordan's initiation of large-scale activities against Israel in
1967228 violated the 1949 armistice agreement and, in effect Jerusalem be-
came an open city to be acquired by Israel or Jordan. Although Jordan
breached the Armistice Agreement, it could still acquire sovereignty in
Jerusalem, because Jerusalem was a limited res nullius.2 29 Nonetheless,
Jordan could not acquire any legal rights in any part of Israel proper.
Israel also was prevented from acquiring any sovereignty right in the
West Bank because this land had a previous legitimate sovereign. How-
22 Most international lawyers upheld the defensive character of Israel's action in 1967.
See Shapira, supra note 65. "Even if the United Nations record on this matter falls short of
establishing an affirmative finding decisively upholding the lawfulness of Israel's action, at
the very least, it provides solid support for Israel's claim to have acted in legitimate exercise
of its right of self defense." Id. at 80. See also J. STONE, THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER CEASE-
FIRE, 7 (1967); Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 L. & CoNTEMP.
PROP. 5 (1968); Franck, Who killed Article 2(4)? 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 821-22 (1970); Com-
ment, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 344 (1970). Article 51 provides as
follows: "Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self defense shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
22 See Gerson, supra note 70, at 14-23, for an excellent discussion whether Israel or
Jordan's action in 1967 was aggressive.
20 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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ever, nothing prevented Jordan or Israel from being vested with sover-
eignty in Jerusalem. All that had to be established was an effective occu-
pation.8 0 By the end of the 1967 war, Israel effectively occupied the
entire city of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem was reunited with West
Jerusalem. 31
V. THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF POWER POLITICS
Since 1967, Israel has been in possession of all of Jerusalem. For thir-
teen years, Israel has administered the city by extending the authority of
its civil government over it.23 2 The result has been a slow integration of
East Jerusalem into Israel proper. Although Israel occupied East Jerusa-
lem and the West Bank at the same time in 1967, Israel's policies toward
each have been different. In the West Bank, Israel acts as a belligerent
occupant, applying a mixture of Jordanian law and military rule.83 In
East Jerusalem, Israel acts as though sovereign. Israel's policy has been to
reunite East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem to create a single city.2 4 Al-
though Israel has only recently officially declared that it has annexed
East Jerusalem,23 5 Israel's conduct in East Jerusalem, as well as its politi-
cal position that Jerusalem is non-negotiable, compel the conclusion that
it has long considered itself the sovereign of all of Jerusalem.
Unfortunately, however, the determination of the correct sovereign in
Jerusalem will not establish peace in the Middle East. It will only estab-
lish the justification for Israel to defend its territorial integrity and politi-
cal freedom by force.238 International law stands behind the correct sover-
eign; terrorism, however, undermines its significance. The Palestinians do
not accept Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem and so they wage a war of
attrition. They want Jerusalem, because it is essential to their nationality
and religion, and because they believe that their claim to Jerusalem is
exclusive. As a result, while Israel may have a legal right of sovereignty in
Jerusalem, it may be forced by political reality to make concessions. The
Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the razing of Cambodia and the Iranian
seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran are current world examples
231 Some have suggested that Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem because Israel's
claim is superior to any other'claim made. "Since . . . no state can make a legal claim to
. . . East Jerusalem that is equal to that of Israel, this relative superiority of Israel may be
sufficient under international law, to make Israel's possession of those territories virtually
indistinguishable from an absolute title to be valid erga omnes." Y. BLUM, supra note 62, at
21. "[H]aving regard to the consideration that . . . Israel acting defensively in 1948 and
1967, on the one hand, and her Arab neighbors, acting aggressively in 1948 and 1967, on the
other, Israel has better title in the territory of what was Palestine, including the whole of
Jerusalem than do Jordan and Egypt." Comment, supra note 228, at 346. See note, supra
note 44, for an excellent explanation on how one determines a superior claim to sovereignty
pursuant to international law and the International Court of Justice.
232 See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
233 See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
134 See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
2"5 See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
131 Dinstein, supra note 65; Shapira, supra note 65.
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that support this conclusion. Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the United
States are all legally correct in their positions of sovereignty, but are all
at the mercy of the illegal action of their respective political aggressors.
Although Israel has been able to guarantee its sovereignty in Jerusa-
lem for the last thirteen years, by creating a successful military force,
Israel must remain aware of its political vulnerability and the effect it can
have on the nation's military strength. Israel must begin to reconsider its
political alternatives. Technological advancement, 237 political heroism,238
and Arab oil239 can ultimately have a devasting effect on Israel's security
as a nation. Israel's policies in international relations and negotiations
should begin to include long term objectives to reduce political tension
over Palestinian claims. Israel's objectives should entail a basic pre-
mise-alleviate mounting political pressure from the Arab world by
granting special rights to Palestinians in Jerusalem without transferring
territorial sovereignty. Israel should make the following proposals in re-
spect to its sovereignty in Jerusalem.
A. Functional Internationalization
Central to the special problem of Jerusalem is that the city contains
some of the most sacred Holy Places to the Muslim, Christian and Jewish
religions.24 0 For example, the Dome of the Rock,24 1 the Church of the
Holy Sepulchre, '2 4 2 and the Wailing Wall 24 3 are all within one-half mile
radius of each other. In order to alleviate the fear of Israeli interference
237 As politics change in the Middle East so too can the balance of power. Anwar
Sadat's peace initiative with Israel has enabled Egypt to gain U.S. economic and military
support. See, Egypt to Get Best Weapons as U.S. Hunts Arab Support, The Wash. Post,
supra note 1, at A18. As the Middle East becomes increasingly technologically advanced,
Israel's security needs may be threatened.
28 Sadat's revolutionary move to Campaign for Peace makes Israel politically vulnera-
ble. Every legitimate hesitance that Israel makes while negotiating with Egypt can be inter-
preted to show lIrael as an uncompromising state. Andrew Young's resignation as the Amer-
ican Ambassador to the United Nations because of his PLO talks, is politically damaging to
Israel, as is Prime Minister Joe Clark's political downfall in Canada partly as a result of his
pledge to shift Canada's embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. See NEwSWEEK Feb. 18, 1980,
at 64.
239 Arab oil is probably the most serious threat to Israel's security. Because Israel's
military strength is completely dependent upon United States support, the Arab oil weapon
becomes extremely effective in squeezing the United States into pressuring Israel to move
on accepting Arab proposals. See J. STORK, MIDDLE EAST OIL AND THE ENERGY CRISIs 210
(1975); M.A. PERSION, GULF OIL IN MIDDLE EAST AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS (1976).
240 See generally, Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 978-1009. Y. BLUM, supra note 62, at
27-32.
, See note 15 supra.
24 See note 7 supra.
242 See note 6 supra.
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with religious freedom and the Holy Places, Israel should continue to en-
dorse the concept of functional internationalization. Functional interna-
tionalization differs from full territorial internationalization 244 in that it
limits international control to the religious shrines and historical sites. By
supporting functional internationalization, Israel in effect limits its exclu-
sive sovereignty over Jerusalem by allowing those who hold the Holy
Places sacred to be responsible for their upkeep and protection.2 45 As a
result, each religious site would be free from municipal or national tax
and vested with a qualified diplomatic immunity status. Preservation,
maintenance, exemptions and protection of the Holy Places would be is-
sues open to discussion. Moreover, the jurisdictional status of religious
courts would have to be clarified. One possibility might be that all reli-
gious disputes are to be subject to the jurisdiction of each faith's religious
courts. For example, Koranic law would be applicable for Arab marriage,
divorce, blasphemy, etc. If a dispute were to arise between two religious
sects, a special court consisting of members of all of the different religious
sects could have final jurisdiction.
Although Israel today does not claim exclusive sovereignty in the
Holy Places in Jerusalem, and conducts its administrative policies accord-
ingly, Israel must emphasize to the world its willingness to endorse func-
tional internationalization or its equivalent "for working out the status of
the Holy Places in a manner conducive to Middle East peace and ecu-
menical harmony. "246
B. Dual Nationality247
Israel should grant to all Palestinian Arabs who wish to live in Jeru-
244 During the critical historical period when the United Nations took control over Pal-
estine after Britain evaded her mandated responsibility, the United Nations was ineffectual
in establishing its plan of corpus separatum for Jerusalem. Moreover it was powerless to
enforce its entire 1948 Partition Plan, and later, its attempt to adapt the Jerusalem statute
was a futile gesture. Accordingly, it now seems impractical to expect Israel to relinquish her
control over Jerusalem in order to allow the United Nations an opportunity to establish
Jerusalem as an international city.
The United Nations' original purpose of establishing Jerusalem as a corpus separatum
was to guarantee the protection of the Holy Places and to further protect the practice of
religious freedom. Israel believes it has accomplished that purpose. See note 71 supra. One
other consideration, is that to endorse a proposal for internationalizing Jerusalem today,
without a vote of the citizens of Jerusalem, would be a denial of the right of self-determina-
tion. Today, that right is a legal right, and not just a political one. See note 168 supra.
245 See note 218 supra.
2 8 Address of Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, to the U.N. General Assembly on
Sept. 19, 1969. 24 U.N. GAOR (1757th plen. mtg.) 15-20 (1969).
147 For a general background on dual nationality see 2 M. WHrrEmAN, supra note 27 at
64-84. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 33, at 142-43.
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salem, not only municipal rights, but automatic citizenship. Each Pales-
tinian living in Jerusalem would have the same rights as any other Israeli
citizen. For example, all Palestinians would have the right to life, liberty
and security of person and would be accorded due process of law. No
Palestinian would be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy or
attacks upon his reputation. All Palestinians would have freedom of re-
ligion, speech, press, and the right to vote in municipal as well as state
elections.
Besides granting Palestinian Arabs immediate Israeli citizenship,
Israel should support the initiation of a dual nationality system for the
future. This suggests that the future respresentative of the Palestinians,
whether it be Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization, or some
other representative of Arab choosing,4 8 should afford the Palestinians in
Jerusalem nationality in a Palestinian state. As a result, the Palestinians
living in Israel would have a dual nationality. The purpose of dual citi-
zenship for the Palestinians is basically twofold. The first relevant aspect
of dual nationality is that the Palestinian Arabs could live peacefully in
Jerusalem and have all the rights of Israeli citizens, while having national
ties to a Palestinian State. The second and more important aspect of dual
citizenship would be that a Palestinian State would have the potential to
regulate and protect its citizens living in Jerusalem. To implement this
latter arrangement of Palestinian protection, Israel would have to support
a limited principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction24 9
The concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law basi-
cally allows one state to give another state the right to exercise a certain
amount of jurisdiction in its territory with respect to certain persons. Ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction at one time was a "common feature of interna-
tional relations."2 50 It was generally allowed by way of arrangements,
called capitulations, and treaties confirming them, giving exclusive juris-
diction to the foreign state over its nationals for civil and criminal acts
committed in the resident state.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction was considered "[a]n expedient for the
facilitating of contacts and relations between parties and groups whose
history, philosophy, political organization, jurisprudence, and administra-
tion of justice were widely dissimilar; it was intended to diminish friction,
minimize causes of conflict, and contribute to malntenace of conditions of
248 See notes 99 & 123 supra.
'"' See 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 278. (Exemptions from Territorial
Jurisdiction).
250 Id.
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law and order .... 25 Moreover, it was generally implemented by West-
ern states because of their distrust of Eastern governments in affording
western nationals effective protection. 52 For example, on the basis of
treaties between Morocco and the United States, the United States had
rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Moroccan territory. As a result,
American nationals who committed crimes in Morocco were tried, not by
the Moroccan courts, but by the American Consul and American law. A
defendant could appeal from the consular court to the American Minister
in Tangiers.2 53
Although extraterritorial jurisdiction is a disappearing concept in in-
ternational law, 254 its application to Jerusalem would be appropriate in a
limited form. Israel would allow the Consul of the Palestinian State to
reside in Jerusalem and exert jurisdiction over its nationals for civil and
criminal transgressions.25 The effect of such an arrangement would be to
diminish Israel's exclusive sovereignty in Jerusalem, by allowing the Pal-
estinian Consul to protect its nationals pursuant to its own laws. The Pal-
estinian Consul's extraterritorial jurisdiction, however, would be limited
by the original choice of the Palestinian defendant. He would have the
exclusive right to determine whether he would be tried by the Israeli
courts or Palestinian courts. This would be so, because the Palestinian
national is also an Israeli citizen and not just an alien.
D. Legislation
Jerusalem cannot be divided into boroughs256 and be .expected to
work as a unified city. Nor will allowing the Arab Palestinians a propor-
251 Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Treaty with China for
the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China, February 11, 1943, reprinted in VIII
DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 195, 245 (Mar. 20, 1943).
252 2 M. WHITEMAN supra note 27, at 278.
253 Id. at 299.
254 See generally 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (1963). See also
note 1 supra.
255 It would be for Israel to determine how broadly or narrowly to interpret "civil and
criminal breaches."
256 Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem, believes Jerusalem should be administered
under a form of borough government, modeled after London's. A large degree of autonomy
would be provided to the Arab "borough" through self rule. Mr. Kollek concedes his plan
falls considerably short of Arab sovereignty and recognizes that his plan has not won Arab
acceptance.
Lord Caradon, former United Nations envoy who formulated United Nations Resolu-
tion 242, as a basis for Mideast settlement, "envisions a unified Jerusalem with Arab and
Jewish 'sister cities.' There would be free movement between the communities for the settle-
ment would be based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, creating a new relation-
ship of trust and cooperation between the Israeli's and the Arabs, a new Jerusalem to bring
about a lasting peace." The Question of Jerusalem, The Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1979.
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tionate municipal vote in electing a mayor suffice. In order to provide
political equality, Israel should implement a plan for the municipal gov-
ernment of Jerusalem which incorporates both equal and proportionate
representation for Arabs and Israelis. A bicameral legislature should be
established in furtherance of this goal. The first branch should be elected
by proportional voting. Jerusalem would be divided by Israeli and Arab
districts. The number of representatives to be elected for each district
would be determined proportionately by the population. However, the
number should be kept small in order to create an effective legislative
body. The second branch should be composed of an equal number of
elected Palestinians and Jews. The number of representatives in this
branch should also be small so that the legislature would be able to work
with minimal confusion. The function of the bicameral legislature would
be to propose legislation for the city. Proposals for legislation could begin
in either branch, but its passing would require a superior vote in its favor
from both branches of the legislature. A mayor would have the duty of
implementing the legislation. He would be elected to office by a popular
vote majority, and would have veto power over the Jerusalem legislature.
Having a unified government in Jerusalem rather than two munici-
palities will help satisfy an Arab complaint of political inequality and will
advance economic growth and the stability of Jerusalem as a single city.
The legislature would have the obligation of creating joint Arab-Israeli
police, fire and rescue squads, as well as unified water and electrical
systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Israel is the current legal sovereign of Jerusalem. It acquired the city
pursuant to international law and as a result, has the right to protect its
sovereignty and territory by the use of force. For thirteen years, Israel has
been able to maintain its sovereignty in Jerusalem because of superior
armies. Presumably, Israel will continue to protect its land in the future
in the same manner. Israel's military strength, however, is not exclusively
dependent on self-reliance. Israel's security as a sovereign in Jerusalem
and ultimately, as a nation, is dependent on international stability and
the inability of the Arab world to undermine that stability. This fragile
formula, however, should not be relied on by Israel to last forever.
Mounting political tensions and international relations are already re-
flecting a shift against Israel.2 5 7
'57 See Oil Pressure, The Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1980, at 1, 27. Consider President Carter's
recent international blunder in supporting Res. 465 which denounced Israel for trying to
change the status of Jerusalem. This was the first time the U.S. endorsed such a Security
Council announcement since the creation of Israel. Although the U.S. repealed its vote, its
original action reflected a potential threat to Israel's security. SiRes. 465 U.N. Doc. S/P.V.
2203 (1980).
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The key to the solution is reevaluation. Israel must reevaluate its na-
tional policy concerning Jerusalem. Although Israel has the right to be
sovereign, it must reconsider long-range goals in guaranteeing that right.
Military strength cannot be the sole answer. Israel must defuse Arab
pressure and propaganda in the international community by providing a
package that will grant the Palestinians sovereign rights in Jerusalem
without undermining Israel's territorial sovereignty. The Arab world must
reevaluate its approach to Jerusalem and should contemplate a worthy
response to an Israeli effort. The international community should en-
courage both. Jerusalem must once again symbolize to the world a city of
coexistence, a city of faith, and above all, a city of peace.

